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Social Networking and Workers’ Compensation Law at the Crossroads
By Jacyln S. Millner* and Gregory M. Duhl**
Abstract
Over the past decade, social networking has increasingly influenced the practice of both
civil and criminal law. One way to illustrate those influences is to examine a ―system‖ of laws
and the parties and lawyers in that system. In this article, we examine how social networking has
influenced workers‘ compensation law, looking at, in particular, the intersection of professional
responsibility, discovery, privacy, and evidence with social networking in state workers‘
compensation systems.
Workers‘ compensation laws are no-fault insurance systems designed to resolve disputes
efficiently. Consequently, the rules of evidence are often more relaxed and the rules of discovery
often more restricted than in state and federal court litigation. The flexible and self-contained
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structure of workers‘ compensation systems provides an ideal backdrop against which to
examine how information from social networking sites can be used as evidence to resolve civil
disputes.
A state‘s workers‘ compensation system should use the rules that have traditionally
applied to non-electronic information as a starting point to address issues arising from lawyers
gathering and introducing into evidence information stored on social networking sites. At the
same time, because of the efficiency of workers‘ compensation law and the large discretion
vested in its judges, workers‘ compensation systems have the potential to be laboratories for new
technologies and how they can be used in the resolution of disputes, both inside and outside of
workers‘ compensation.
I.

INTRODUCTION
Workers‘ compensation systems1 provide a backdrop against which to examine how

lawyers and judges can use evidence from social networking sites to help resolve civil disputes.
An employee2 alleging a workplace injury could communicate feelings, information, or
photographs on a social networking site that contradict her claim. While the employee‘s attorney
1

Each state has its own workers‘ compensation system governed by state statute and

administrative rules. See Office of Disability Employment Policy, U.S. DEP‘T OF LABOR,
http://www.dol.gov/odep/pubs/fact/employ.htm (last visited Aug. 22, 2010) (―Workers'
Compensation laws are administered at the state level. . . . Because each state has its own system,
coverage varies.‖). In this article, we focus on the common elements of those systems.
2

We use ―employee‖ and ―plaintiff‖ interchangeably in this article to refer to the workers‘

compensation claimant. The claimant could be a former employee, if employed at the time the
alleged injury occurred.
2

should counsel her client to exercise caution in making such communications, defense counsel3
faces the challenge of gathering and introducing such communications into evidence.4
Despite this potential for social networking evidence, its use in workers‘ compensation
cases and civil litigation more generally is uncommon. Consequently, there is a relative absence
of cases, statutes, rules, and ethics opinions that prescribe attorney conduct in gathering and
introducing such evidence. Because workers‘ compensation systems are discrete, efficient, and

3

In workers‘ compensation litigation, the ―defense‖ includes both the employer and insurer. The

employer contracts with the insurer to provide workers‘ compensation coverage. We use
―defense counsel‖ in this article to refer to counsel for the employer and the insurer, whether the
same or different. The insurer typically controls the litigation, as the insurer is the party paying
workers‘ compensation benefits to the employee. See, e.g., Herring v. Jackson, 122 S.E.2d 366,
371–72 (N.C. 1961) (finding the insurer to be the ―real party in interest‖ because the employer
had nothing to gain or lose in the action and any recovered amount would inure to the insurance
company); Russell v. Md. Cas. Co., 174 S.E. 101, 104 (N.C. 1934) (―The insurer is practically
the real party to the controversy and controls the litigation.‖). Most workers‘ compensation
insurance policies also provide language indicating that the insurer controls the litigation, and the
employer must assist the insurer in litigation against the employee upon request.
4

See Shannon Awsumb, Social Networking Sites: The Next E-Discovery Frontier, 66 MINN.

BENCH & B., Nov. 2009, at 10, 23 (Nov. 2009), available at
http://www.mnbar.org/benchandbar/2009/nov09/networking.html (―Experienced attorneys know
that embracing new technologies—such as social networking sites—can make the difference
between winning and losing cases.‖).
3

discretionary, they are ideal systems within which to explore how social networking and other
new technologies can be used in the resolution of disputes.
Workers‘ compensation laws are no-fault, providing compensation for job-related
injuries5 and offering an efficient mechanism for claim resolution.6 They protect employees by
providing assured and prompt compensation for work-related injuries and consequential loss of
income without the parties and attorneys expending the excessive time and resources typical of
state and federal court litigation.7
5

See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. XIV, § 4 (―The Legislature is hereby expressly vested with plenary

power, unlimited by any provision of this Constitution, to create, and enforce a complete system
of workers‘ compensation, by appropriate legislation, and in that behalf to create and enforce a
liability on the part of any or all persons to compensate any or all of their workers for injury or
disability, and their dependents for death incurred or sustained by the said workers in the course
of their employment, irrespective of the fault of any party.‖); Curtis v. G.E. Capital Modular
Space, 155 S.W.3d 877, 884 (Tenn. 2005) (―To do so would confuse the fault-based liability of
tort with the statutorily imposed ‗no fault‘ liability of workers‘ compensation.‖).
6

See United Airlines, Inc. v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 993 P.2d 1152, 1161 (Colo. 2000)

(―Traditionally, workers‘ compensation laws have provided an efficient system for remedying
the effects of allocating the costs of industrial injuries.‖).
7

See Ruggery v. N.C. Dep‘t of Corrections, 520 S.E.2d 77, 81 (N.C. Ct. App. 1999) (―The

policy underlying the Worker‘s Compensation Act is to ‗provide a swift and certain remedy to an
injured worker and to ensure a limited and determinate liability for employers.‘‖ (quoting
Matthews v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hosp. Auth., 510 S.E.2d 388, 393 (N.C. Ct. App. 1999)));
Lascio v. Belcher Roofing Corp., 704 A.2d 642, 644–45 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997) (―[The] purpose of
4

Similarly, social networking sites enable individuals to exchange information efficiently
over the internet.8 Social networking provides a structure for people to express their personalities
and identities, and meet people with similar interests.9 Individuals can have online profiles,10
friends,11 blogs, discussions, and groups.12 Users may also post pictures, videos, and other
[the workers‘ compensation system] is to protect employees by providing quick and certain
compensation for work-related injuries and resultant loss of injuries without wasting time and
expenses on litigation.‖).
8

See Kristi L. Gustafson, Social Networks Alter Reunion Dynamics, ALBANY TIMES UNION (Apr.

29, 2010, 5:28 PM), http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/life/main/6980262.html (―Social
networking is an efficient, cost-effective way to share information.‖).
9

See Daniel Nations, What Is Social Networking?, ABOUT.COM,

http://webtrends.about.com/od/socialnetworking/a/social-network.htm (last visited Aug. 20,
2010).
10

Profiles include basic information, including a person‘s age, location, and interests. See id.

11

Friends are ―trusted members of [an individual‘s profile] [who] are allowed to post comments

on [the] profile or send [the individual] private messages.‖ Id. When a person sends an invitation
to someone to become a ―friend‖ on Facebook or other social networking site, if the individual
accepts, the inviter and invitee have access to each other‘s information and can communicate
with one another. See Definition of Friending, PCMAG.COM,
http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia_term/0,2542,t=friending&i=61604,00.asp (last visited
Aug. 20, 2010). After ―friending‖ another social networking user on the same site, friends can be
subsequently ―defriended‖ or ―unfriended,‖ which terminates the ―friendship‖ and users‘ access
to each other‘s information. See id. Not all social networking sites use the term ―friends‖;
5

information to their social networking profiles.13 By facilitating connections with friends,
relatives, and those with similar interests, social networking creates a sense of intimacy and
community for users.14
Nearly half of adult Americans have a social networking profile,15 with Facebook and
MySpace the most popular sites.16 As social networking continues to play an increasingly
LinkdIn, for example, uses the term ―connections.‖ See Nations, supra note 9. However, all sites
permit a user to designate another member as trusted and give that person access to the user‘s
information. See id.
12

See Nations, supra note 9. Groups enable social networking users on a site to find people with

similar interests or backgrounds. See id. A group can have any sort of focus, from ―Diet Coke
Lovers‖ to ―Valley High School Class of 1999‖ to a particular book, television show, or movie.
See id.
13

See id.

14

See Awsumb, supra note 4, at 23 (―Social networking sites are now widely recognized to be a

key source of information regarding a person because ‗[a]lthough these sites provide users with a
sense of intimacy and community, they also create a potentially permanent record of personal
information that becomes a virtual information bonanza about a litigant‘s private life and state of
mind.‘‖ (quoting Ronald J. Levine & Susan L. Swatski-Lebson, Are Social Networking Sites
Discoverable?, LAW.COM (Nov. 13, 2008),
http://www.law.com/jsp/lawtechnologynews/PubArticleLTN.jsp?id=1202425974937)).
15

See TOM WEBSTER, THE SOCIAL HABIT—FREQUENT SOCIAL NETWORKERS: THE

EDISON/ARBITRON INTERNET AND MULTIMEDIA STUDY 2010, at 4 (2010), available at
http://www.edisonresearch.com/The_Social_Habit_Edison_Social_Media_Study_2010.pdf
6

prevalent role in society, lawyers and judges involved in workers‘ compensation will have to
confront discovery, professional responsibility, privacy, and evidentiary issues that arise in
connection with social networking evidence.17
Part II of this article discusses legal issues related to gathering information stored on a
social networking site from both the employee and social networking site operator. Part III goes
on to address professional responsibility issues that arise for plaintiffs‘ and defense attorneys in
connection with an employee maintaining, and defense counsel gathering, information stored on
a social networking site. Part IV discusses issues relating to admitting social networking
evidence at the time of a workers‘ compensation hearing or trial, after it has been obtained by
defense counsel. We conclude in Part V that workers‘ compensation systems should use the
existing rules governing the discovery and admissibility of electronic and non-electronic
information as a starting point in addressing issues that arise at the crossroads of social
networking and workers‘ compensation law. As efficient systems, providing considerable
discretion to the judge, workers‘ compensation laws offer lawyers and judges the ability to
address and explore the role of social networking evidence in dispute resolution.

(stating that a survey from February 2010 found 48 percent of Americans have a profile on
Facebook, MySpace, or another social networking site); Adults on Social Network Sites, 2005–
2009, PEW INTERNET (Oct. 8, 2009), http://www.pewinternet.org/Infographics/Growth-in-AdultSNS-Use-20052009.aspx (stating that 46 percent of American adults use some type of social
networking site).
16

See Awsumb, supra note 4, at 23.

17

See id. (―Experienced attorneys know that embracing new technologies—such as social

networking sites—can make the difference between winning and losing cases.‖).
7

II.

DISCOVERING EMPLOYEE INFORMATION STORED ON SOCIAL NETWORKING SITES
This Part explores the legal issues that can arise when defense counsel seeks an

employee‘s communications and other information stored on a social networking site. We
address two topics: (A) the extent to which an employee‘s information stored on a social
networking site is discoverable from the employee in a workers‘ compensation case; and (B) the
extent to which an employee‘s information stored on a social networking site is discoverable
from the third-party site operator in a workers‘ compensation case. The employee‘s privacy and
the Stored Communications Act, part of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, potentially
limit discovery from the site operator.
A.

DISCOVERY OF SOCIAL NETWORKING INFORMATION FROM THE EMPLOYEE

This Part focuses on the rules regulating discovery18 in workers‘ compensation cases and
the few state and federal cases that suggest defense counsel can acquire relevant information
stored on a social networking site from an employee.
18

This Part uses the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to discuss discovery in state workers‘

compensation courts. To date, the majority of states have adopted the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, with minimal changes. See Rules of Civil Procedure, USLEGAL.COM,
http://civilprocedure.uslegal.com/rules-of-civil-procedure/ (last visited Aug. 20, 2010)
(―[T]hirty-five states have adopted the federal rules as their own procedural code.‖). In most
states, though workers‘ compensation courts are governed by administrative rules, they have
adopted the state‘s rules of civil procedure with regard to discovery. See, e.g., FLA. ADMIN. CODE
ANN. r. 60Q-6.114 (2010) (applying the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure to workers‘
compensation proceedings); GA. CODE ANN. § 34-9-102(d)(1) (2008 & Supp. 2009) (―Discovery
procedures shall be governed and controlled by Chapter 11 of Title 9, the ‗Georgia Civil Practice
8

Act.‘‖); IDAHO R. PRAC. & P. 7(C) (―Procedural matters relating to discovery, except sanctions,
shall be controlled by the appropriate provisions of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.‖); IND.
CODE ANN. § 22-3-1-3 (West 2005) (―The worker‘s compensation board may adopt rules under
IC 4-22-2 to carry into effect the worker‘s compensation law (IC 22-3-2 through IC 22-3-6) and
the worker‘s occupational diseases law (IC 22-3-7).‖); IOWA ADMIN. CODE r. 876-4.35(86)
(2009) (―The rules of civil procedure shall govern the contested case proceedings before the
workers‘ compensation commissioner . . . .‖); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85, ch. 4, app., R. 30 (West
2005) (―[P]roduction of documentary evidence shall be obtained in accordance with Title 12 of
the Oklahoma Statutes [Oklahoma state rules of civil procedure].‖); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §
656.285 (West 2003) (―ORCP [Oregon Rule of Civil Procedure] 36 C shall apply to workers‘
compensation cases, except that the Administrative Law Judge shall make the determinations
and orders required of the court in ORCP 36 C, and in addition attorney fees shall not be
declared as a matter of course but only in cases of harassment or hardship.‖); Camelback
Contractors, Inc. v. Indus. Comm‘n, 608 P.2d 782, 785 (Ariz. 1980) (holding that discovery
before the industrial commission in Arizona ―should not be more restrictive than that employed
in superior court‖); Mid-Delta Home Health, Inc. v. Robertson, 749 So. 2d 379, 388 (Miss. Ct.
App. 1999) (―[The Workers‘ Compensation] Commission will not disregard the time-honored
guidelines of discovery . . . .‖).
States such as Minnesota, which follow more restrictive rules for discovery in workers‘
compensation cases to speed up the claim-resolution process, do permit the compensation judge
to order discovery under the state‘s rules of civil procedure. See MINN. R. 1420.2200, subp. 3
(2006) (―The judge may order discovery available under the Rules of Civil Procedure for the
district courts of Minnesota provided that the discovery: . . . is needed for the proper presentation
9

1.

Background of E-Discovery and the Scope of Discovery

of a party‘s case . . . . ‖); Edeogu v. Bauerly Bros., No. WC05-202, 2005 MN Wrk. Comp.
LEXIS 247, at *5 (W.C.C.A. Aug. 30, 2005) (stating that the workers‘ compensation court may
rely on the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure).
Moreover, some states with more restrictive discovery rules specifically permit
surveillance as a form of discovery, see, e.g., MINN. R. 1420.2200, subp. 8(A), and informal
discovery of social networking evidence is a form of surveillance. See, e.g., id. (―Surveillance
evidence includes any photographic, video, digital, motion picture, or other electronic recording
or depiction of a party surreptitiously taken or obtained without the party‘s expressed permission
or knowledge.‖); see also Anders Albrechtslund, Online Social Networking as Participatory
Surveillance, FIRST MONDAY (Mar. 2008),
http://www.uic.edu/htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/2142/1949(―First, online
social networking is related to the traditional hierarchical surveillance concept. . . . The word
surveillance is etymologically associated with the French word surveiller, which translates
simply as to watch over. The verb suggests the visual practice of a person looking carefully at
someone or something from above. Both in ordinary language and within academic debate, the
practice of ‗watching over‘ has become a metaphor for all other monitoring activities. Thus, the
understanding of surveillance is not limited to a visual practice; rather it involves all senses—
data collection and technological mediation.‖ ). Consequently, in states with restricted workers‘
compensation discovery rules, defense counsel can discover social networking evidence, either
by following the rules for conducting surveillance or the state‘s rules of civil procedure.
10

The discovery process makes relevant information available to litigants.19 Electronic
discovery allows parties to obtain ―electronically stored information‖ (―ESI‖),20 a term adopted
by the amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 2006.21 ESI includes digital

19

See Aaron Blank, On the Precipe of E-Discovery: Can Litigants Obtain Employee Social

Networking Web Site Information Through Employers?, 18 CATH. U. COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
487, 495 (2010) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee‘s note (1983)). ―Discovery‖
describes evidence obtained during the pre-trial stage of a lawsuit. See Ken LaMance, Electronic
Discovery—Can Contents of My Electronic Communications Be Used as Evidence in Court?,
EZINE ARTICLES, http://ezinearticles.com/?Electronic-Discovery---Can-Contents-of-MyElectronic-Communications-Be-Used-As-Evidence-in-Court?&id=3962081 (last visited Aug. 20,
2010).
20

See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(ii), 33(d), 34(a)(1)(A); see also LaMance, supra note 19

(―Electronically Stored Information, or ‗ESI,‘ is an actual legal term adopted by the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure in 2006. ESI refers to information that is created, stored, and used in
digital form, and requires the use of a computer for access.‖).
21

Blank, supra note 19, at 495–96; LaMance, supra note 19; see FED. R. CIV. P. 26. The

advisory committee found the amendments to be necessary for two primary reasons:
First, electronically stored information has important differences from
information recorded on paper. The most salient of these differences are that
electronically stored information is retained in exponentially greater volume than
hard-copy documents; electronically stored information is dynamic, rather than
static; and electronically stored information may be incomprehensible when
11

information that can be accessed only by computer.22 The rules regulating discovery more
generally also govern ESI.23
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1) outlines the scope of discovery, including the
discovery of ESI. The scope of discovery is broad, and non-privileged information that is
―relevant to any party‘s claim or defense‖ is discoverable.24 States that follow more limited rules
of discovery for workers‘ compensation claims also use a relevancy standard with respect to
discovery of surveillance evidence,25 which includes information stored on a social networking
site. The standard for determining ―relevance is ‗whether there is any possibility that the
information sought may be relevant to the subject matter of the action.‘‖26
separated from the system that created it. Second, these differences are causing
problems in discovery that rule amendments can helpfully address.
CIVIL RULES ADVISORY COMM., REPORT OF THE CIVIL RULES ADVISORY COMMITTEE 18 (July 25,
2005), available at SL061 ALI-ABA 1101, 1103 (Westlaw).
22

LaMance, supra note 19. Examples of ESI include e-mails, websites, and digitally stored

documents and pictures. Id.
23

See id.

24

FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).

25

See, e.g., MINN. R. 1420.2200, subp. 8(A) (2006) (indicating that relevant surveillance

evidence is discoverable).
26

AM Int‘l, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 100 F.R.D. 255, 257 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (internal

quotations omitted); see also TBG Ins. Servs. Corp. v. Superior Court, 117 Cal. Rptr. 2d 155,
160 (Ct. App. 2002) (―[The defendant] is entitled to discover any non-privileged information,
cumulative or not, that may reasonably assist it in developing its defense, preparing for trial, or
12

As social networking continues to become more popular and widespread, information
relevant to employees‘ workers‘ compensation claims could be available on Facebook and other
social networking sites.27 Such sites serve as a significant information source because,
―[a]lthough [they] provide users with a sense of intimacy and community, they also create a
potentially permanent record of personal information that becomes a virtual information bonanza

facilitating a settlement.‖); Blank, supra note 19, at 496 (―The test for relevance is ‗whether there
is any possibility that the information sought may be relevant to the subject matter of the
action.‘‖ (quoting AM Int‘l, 100 F.R.D. at 257) (internal quotations omitted)).
27

See Awsumb, supra note 4, at 22 (―Attorneys can discover the user‘s postings, list of friends,

shared photos and videos, and other valuable information. If a person has heightened security
settings, attorneys may still be able to discover the social networking account, but will not be
able to access the person‘s profile information unless the user provides permission through
granting a ‗friend‘ request. Even if attorneys can only gather limited information informally, that
information can provide a means to tailor subsequent formal discovery.‖); Leora Maccabee,
Facebook 101: Why Lawyers Should Be on Facebook, LAWYERIST.COM (Apr. 23, 2009),
http://lawyerist.com/facebook-101-why-lawyers-should-be-on-facebook/ (―Facebook can be an
effective tool for investigating defendants, witnesses, and prosecutors. Evidence revealed from
profile searches has been used . . . to show the extent of plaintiffs‘ injuries after an accident.‖).
Take one example from a products liability case. A federal district court dismissed a welder‘s
claim when defense lawyers discovered pictures of him on Facebook racing motorboats despite
his disability claims. See Liz McKenzie, Poking Around Facebook Could Win Your Case,
LAW360 (Feb. 4, 2010), http://www.law360.com/articles/147130.
13

about a litigant‘s private life and state of mind.‖28 An employee alleging a workplace injury
could post photographs, communications, or other information that either contradict a workplace
injury claim, or alert defense investigators of times and places to engage in surveillance.29
2.

Informal Discovery

Social networking information can be discovered both formally and informally.
Attorneys can informally discover information by searching on Google, Yahoo! or any other
search engine for the employee and seeing if a link to an employee‘s social networking account

28

29

Blank, supra note 19, at 497 (quoting Levine & Swatski-Lebson, supra note 14).
See Roberto Ceniceros, Comp Cheats Confess All on Social Networking Sites, WORKFORCE

MGMT. ONLINE (Sept. 2009), http://www.workforce.com/section/02/feature/26/66/08/ (―Then
there is the listing of physical activities . . . . [I]nvestigators found the claimant‘s Facebook site
and learned about his participation in bowling tournaments and a bowling alley he frequented. . .
. An investigator visiting the bowling alley found a large banner congratulating the claimant for
rolling a perfect game and the date he rolled the game.‖); Michael O‘Connor & Assocs., LLC,
Workers‘ Compensation Investigators Use Social Networking Sites to Nab Fraudulent
Claimants, PA. WORKERS‘ COMPENSATION LAW. BLOG (Sept. 30, 2009, 9:19 AM EST),
http://www.pennsylvaniaworkerscompensationlawyersblog.com/2009/09/workers-compensationinvestiga.html (―By searching for a claimant‘s profile on sites like Facebook or MySpace,
investigators can uncover a myriad of self-incriminating information, such as dates of sporting
events in which the claimant is participating. Social networking sites can also contain timestamped photos and videos showing claimants involved in physical activities that could be
outside the level of disability that the injured worker is claiming.‖).
14

comes up in the results.30 In addition, attorneys can search individual social networking sites,
such as Facebook and MySpace, by the name of the employee.31
Whether an individual‘s social networking profile and information can be publicly
viewed depends on the particular social networking website and the individual‘s specific security
settings. By using the site‘s control settings, users of Facebook, MySpace, and other social
networking sites are able to control whether the information provided on their profile is public or
private.32 A user may place his or her security settings on a spectrum ranging from a completely
public profile, which may be viewed by anyone, to a private profile, which is accessible only to
individuals the user accepts as ―friends‖ or ―connections.‖33 Just as a workers‘ compensation
30

See Awsumb, supra note 4, at 23.

31

See id.

32

See id. (―Most social networking sites, including Facebook and MySpace, enable individual

users to control whether their information is private or public and to whom it can be
disseminated.‖).
33

See id. (―The security settings range from uncensored, public profiles that can be accessed and

located through the social networking site or any internet search engine, to private profiles,
accessible only to persons designated as friends.‖). If a particular user‘s Facebook account, for
example, has low security settings, the general public can access the individual‘s profile by
searching the internet or by searching for the person‘s name on the Facebook website. Attorneys
and others can discover the individual‘s list of friends, shared postings, photographs, and videos.
See id. at 24. If an individual sets high security settings, attorneys may still be able to discover
that the individual has a Facebook account, but will not be able to view the individual‘s profile or
information unless the individual allows the attorney to do so by extending or accepting a
15

attorney may use informal discovery to observe an employee in a public place, such as a park or
a restaurant,34 so too is a workers‘ compensation attorney able to use informal discovery to
observe and search information publicly available online. When conducting informal discovery,
however, attorneys should be cognizant of professional responsibility obligations.35
3.

Formal Discovery

Social networking information that is not publicly available can be obtained through the
formal discovery process. Rule 34(a)(1)(A) allows a party to request ―any designated documents
or electronically stored information—including . . . data or data compilations—stored in any
medium‖ in ―the responding party‘s possession, custody, or control.‖36 Accordingly, defense
―friend‖ request. See id. Individuals with very high security settings can even prevent the public
from uncovering that they have a Facebook account through searches on the internet or the
Facebook website.
34

See Baumann v. Joyner Silver & Electroplating, 47 W.C.D. 611, 1992 MN Wrk. Comp.

LEXIS 622, at *15 n.3 (W.C.C.A. Sept. 1, 1992) (finding that, as a general rule, contact made to
acquire information that an employee would normally provide to the public in the course of
public activities is not proscribed conduct).
35

See infra Part III.

36

FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a)(1), 34(a)(1)(A). Rule 34 was ―intended to be broad enough to cover all

current types of computer-based information, and flexible enough to encompass future changes
and developments.‖ FED. R. CIV. P. 34 advisory committee‘s note (2006). Rules 33 and 26(a)(1)
also address formal discovery of electronically stored information. See Michael A. Oakes,
Meghan A. Podolny & John W. Woods Jr., Social Networking Sites and the E-Discovery
Process, DATA PROTECTION L. & POL‘Y (Feb. 2010), at 1,
16

counsel may request any information posted and stored on social networking websites, including
discussion and message postings, pictures, and videos relevant to the employee‘s claim.
Employees in workers‘ compensation cases should disclose such relevant information in
response to narrowly tailored discovery requests.37 If a plaintiff‘s attorney objects to the
production of this information, the defense attorney must demonstrate its relevance.38 If a
document request for social networking information is at least facially relevant and the plaintiff

http://www.hunton.com/files/tbl_s47Details%5CFileUpload265%5C2856%5CEDiscovery_DPLP_Feb10.pdf (―Firstly, the amendments introduced the phrase ‗electronically
stored information‘ to Rules 26(a)(1), 33, and 34 to acknowledge that ESI is discoverable.‖).
37

See Awsumb, supra note 4, at 24 (―Courts are willing to require users to produce social

networking information in response to narrowly tailored discovery requests.‖); see also
Mackelprang v. Fidelity Nat‘l Title Agency of Nev., Inc., No. 2:06-cv-00788-JCM-GWF, 2007
WL 119149, at *8 (D. Nev. Jan. 9, 2007) (finding that the employer could discover MySpace
messages relating to issues relevant to the case); Ledbetter v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 06-cv01958-WYD-MJW, 2009 WL 1067018, at *2 (D. Colo. Apr. 21, 2009) (―[T]he information
sought within the four corners of the subpoenas issued to Facebook, MySpace, Inc., and
Meetup.com is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence a[nd] is
relevant to the issues in this case.‖).
38

See Oakes, Podolny & Woods, supra note 36, at 1 (―Although ESI is potentially

discoverable—in any form—in US litigation, if a party objects to the production of social
networking data, the litigant seeking the information will still be required to demonstrate its
relevance.‖).
17

is able, but does not wish, to produce the relevant document, the plaintiff‘s attorney has the
burden of establishing that the document is not relevant in order to avoid producing it.39
In EEOC v. Simply Storage Management, LLC, an employment law case, a magistrate
judge ordered employees to produce social networking profile information from their Facebook
and MySpace accounts in response to a discovery request.40 The EEOC filed a sexual harassment
complaint on behalf of two employees against their supervisor.41 It requested a discovery
conference because counsel disagreed about the proper scope of discovery involving social
networking documents, including items from Facebook and MySpace.42 The EEOC objected to
39

See Scott v. Leavenworth Unified Sch. Dist. No. 453, 190 F.R.D. 583, 585 (D. Kan.

1999) (―When the discovery sought appears relevant, the party resisting the discovery has the
burden to establish the lack of relevance . . . .‖); Blank, supra note 19, at 496 (―If a request for
information is facially relevant and the party does not wish to produce it, the producing party
must establish the document is not relevant.‖).
40

Order on Discovery Issues Raised During April 21 Conference, EEOC v. Simply Storage

Mgmt., LLC, No. 1:09-cv-1223-WTL-DML, at 1 (S.D. Ind. May 11, 2010), available at
http://www.scribd.com/full/31921843?access_key=key-2i8jdft9a1tammq659sv [hereinafter
Order on Discovery].
41

Id.

42

Id. at 2. The disputed documents requested through the formal discovery process included:
Request No. 1: All photographs or videos posted by Joanie Zupan or anyone on
her behalf on Facebook or MySpace from April 23, 2007 to the present.
Request No. 2: Electronic copies of Joanie Zupan‘s complete profile on Facebook
and MySpace (including all updates, changes or modifications to Zupan‘s profile) and all
18

the demand for the production of all documents related to the plaintiffs‘ social networking
accounts and to deposition testimony about the employees‘ social networking profiles on the
grounds that the requests were overbroad, not relevant, unduly burdensome, harassing, and
embarrassing toward the employees.43 Magistrate Judge Debra Lynch found that the standard for
discovery‘s scope is broad,44 and noted that where relevance is in doubt, the court should be
permissive.45

status updates, messages, wall comments, causes joined, groups joined, activity streams,
blog entries, details, blurbs, comments, and applications (including, but not limited to,
―How well do you know me‖ and the ―Naughty Application‖) for the period from April
23, 2007 to the present. To the extent electronic copies are not available, please provide
the documents in hard copy form.
Request No. 3: All photographs or videos posted by Tara Strahl or anyone on her
behalf on Facebook or MySpace from October 11, 2007 to November 26, 2008.
Request No. 4: Electronic copies of Tara Strahl‘s complete profile on Facebook
and MySpace (including all updates, changes, or modifications to Strahl‘s profile) and all
status updates, messages, wall comments, causes joined, groups joined, activity streams,
blog entries, details, blurbs, comments, and applications (including, but not limited to,
―How well do you know me‖ and the ―Naughty Application‖) for the period from
October 11, 2007 to November 26, 2008. To the extent electronic copies are not
available, please provide the documents in hard copy form.
Id.
43

Id. at 3.

44

Id. at 4; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 26. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b) reads:
19

However, she also emphasized that the scope of discovery is not limitless.46 The EEOC
argued that discovery of Facebook and MySpace profiles should be limited to information that
Unless otherwise limited by court order, the scope of discovery is as follows:
Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any
party‘s claim or defense — including the existence, description, nature, custody,
condition, and location of any documents or other tangible things and the identity and
location of persons who know of any discoverable matter. For good cause, the court may
order discovery of any matter relevant to the subject matter involved in the action.
Relevant information need not be admissible at the trial if the discovery appears
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. All discovery is
subject to the limitations imposed by Rule 26(b)(2)(C).
45

Order on Discovery, supra note 40, at 4; see also Truswal Sys. Corp. v. Hydro-Air Eng‘g, Inc.,

813 F.2d 1207, 1211–12 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (discussing the scope of Rule 26(b)(1)).
46

See Order on Discovery, supra note 40, at 4 (citing Rozell v. Ross-Holst, No. 05 Civ.

2936(JGK)(JCF), 2006 WL 163143, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 20, 2006)). Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 26(b)(2)(C) provides that:
On motion or on its own, the court must limit the frequency or extent of discovery
otherwise allowed by these rules or by local rule if it determines that:
(i) the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or can
be obtained from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or
less expensive;
(ii) the party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity to obtain the
information by discovery in the action; or
20

directly relates to issues raised in the complaint.47 Ultimately, Magistrate Judge Lynch found all
social networking content revealing, relating, or simply referring to allegations raised in the
complaint to be discoverable.48 Judge Lynch also found that the fact that a user‘s profile is
private and not available to the public does not shield information in that user‘s profile from
discovery.49
Similarly, in Bass v. Miss Porter‘s School, a case involving harassment of a high school
student at an elite boarding school, the plaintiff objected to a discovery request for information
from his Facebook profile.50 Again, the court found a low threshold for the discovery of social
networking information. The court held:
Facebook usage depicts a snapshot of the user‘s relationships and state of mind at
the time of the content‘s posting and that the content‘s relevance to both liability
and damages would be ―more in the eye of the beholder than subject to strict legal

(iii) the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely
benefit, considering the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the parties‘
resources, the importance of the issues at stake in the action, and the importance
of the discovery in resolving the issues.
47

Order on Discovery, supra note 40, at 5.

48

Id. at 9–10. This content included third-party communications, videos, and photographs posted

on Facebook and MySpace. Id.
49

Id. at 6.

50

No. 3:08cv1807(JBA), 2009 WL 3724968, at *1 (D. Conn. Oct. 27, 2009).
21

demarcations‖ of what one party determines might be ―reasonably calculated to
lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.‖51
The court in Bass upheld the broad relevancy standard for discovery of social networking
information, and the result should be no different in the workers‘ compensation context. Defense
counsel should be able to discover information that is relevant to allegations raised in the
employee‘s initial pleading,52 including information relating to the employee‘s alleged work
injuries or employment abilities.

51

Id.; see also Oakes, Podolny & Woods, supra note 36, at 1 (―The court disagreed, holding that

‗Facebook usage depicts a snapshot of the user‘s relationships and state of mind at the time of
the content‘s posting‘ and that the content‘s relevance to both liability and damages would be
‗more in the eye of the beholder than subject to strict legal demarcations‘ of what one party
determines might be ‗reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.‘‖).
52

The plaintiff‘s initial pleading in non-workers‘ compensation state court matters is typically

known as the ―complaint,‖ pursuant to the state‘s rules of civil procedure. Workers‘
compensation courts and rules, however, refer to the employee‘s first pleading by different
terms, including ―Claim Petition‖ and ―Employee Claim.‖ See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 176.291
(2008); MINN. R. 1415.1000, subp. 1; N.J.A.C. 12:235-3.1, available at
http://lwd.dol.state.nj.us/labor/forms_pdfs/wc/pdf/rules.pdf; How to File a Claim, N.Y. ST.
WORKERS‘ COMPENSATION BD., http://www.wcb.state.ny.us/content/main/onthejob/howto.jsp
(last visited Aug. 20, 2010).
22

Moreover, a federal magistrate judge in New Jersey found writings shared on social
networking sites to be discoverable.53 In Beye v. Horizon Blue Cross Blue Shield,54 an insurer
sought production of all e-mails, journals, diaries, and communications involving minor
children‘s eating disorders or manifestations and symptoms of the eating disorders.55 Magistrate
Judge Patty Shwartz ordered the minors to produce all entries on web pages, such as Facebook
and MySpace, which the minors had shared with others.56 Again, Beye indicates that there is
precedent for workers‘ compensation courts to permit discovery of all entries on social
networking sites that relate to an employee‘s physical abilities.
4.
53

Defenses to Formal Discovery

Order Denying Motion for Reconsideration, Beye v. Horizon Blue Cross Blue Shield of N.J.,

No. 2:06-cv-5377-FSH-PS, at 5–6 (D.N.J. Dec. 14, 2007), available at
http://www.onpointnews.com/docs/anorexia2b.pdf [hereinafter Order Denying Motion for
Reconsideration]. This order modified an October 31, 2007, order as follows:
(1) [N]o later than January 15, 2008, plaintiffs shall produce writings shared with others
including entries on websites such as ―Facebook‖ or ―MySpace‖; (2) plaintiffs shall
preserve journals, diaries and writings not shared with others and if defendants‘ experts
believe they are needed to render an opinion then they can make an application seeking
their production; and (3) writings shared with health care professionals shall be produced
as part of the medical records.
Id. at 5–6.
54

Nos. 06-5337 & 06-6219, 2008 WL 3064757 (D.N.J. July 29, 2008).

55

Order Denying Motion for Reconsideration, supra note 53, at 5–6.

56

Id.
23

Even if a party establishes that discovery of an employee‘s social networking profile
information is relevant, a court may exclude it from discovery if it is privileged, if its production
would impose an undue burden on the employee, or if the employee ―has superseding privacy
interests in the account.‖57 Rule 26(b)(5) states that discoverable information may be withheld if
it is privileged.58 Privileged information may include information subject to the attorney-client
privilege, commercial trade secrets, private settlement agreements, and employment
confidentiality agreements.59 Additionally, a party need not produce ESI that is ―not reasonably
accessible because of undue burden or cost.‖60
5.

Suggestions for Workers’ Compensation Attorneys Relating to
Formal Discovery

In order to generate disclosure of social networking information from the employee
through the formal discovery process, workers‘ compensation defense attorneys should ask in
57

Blank, supra note 19, at 506; see also infra Part II.B.2 (discussing employee‘s defense of

privacy).
58

FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5).

59

See Blank, supra note 19, at 506. Such forms of privileged information are generally not

applicable to workers‘ compensation litigation, where information is obtained from either the
employee or social networking provider directly, and the employer previously signed an
insurance policy agreeing to provide information to the insurer to assist in the defense of any
workers‘ compensation claim.
60

FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B). In practice, courts use a balancing test to weigh the benefit and

relevance of the information versus the burden and cost of producing it. See Blank, supra note
19, at 506.
24

their interrogatories, or other form of discovery demand pursuant to their state‘s rules governing
discovery, for the names of any social networking sites used by the employee and request copies
of all relevant photographs, videos, postings, communications, and discussions from social
networking sites relating to the employee‘s physical or employment abilities.61 Defense attorneys
should include similar questions during the employee‘s deposition.62 In order to comply with the
rules governing discovery, plaintiffs‘ attorneys should encourage employees to disclose relevant
social networking photographs, videos, postings, and other communications in response to a
valid discovery request from defense counsel.
B.

DISCOVERY FROM SITE OPERATORS

In addition to obtaining social networking profile information from the employee directly
through the formal discovery process, attorneys can recover the employee‘s profile information
from the social networking site operator under some circumstances.63 In situations where an
employee refuses to disclose social networking profile information, or where the defense
attorney believes or knows the employee has deleted all or part of his or her account, or has
failed to disclose all information, defense counsel should consider using a narrowly tailored
subpoena to the social networking site operator, as the records custodian, to provide copies of
61

See Awsumb, supra note 4, at 24 (―Include interrogatories seeking the identification of social

networking sites used by a person and all user profiles and accounts. Include document requests
seeking production of relevant information maintained or shared by a person on social
networking sites, including video and photos.‖).
62

See id. (―Inquire regarding social networking usage during deposition questioning.‖).

63

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a) permits a party to make a motion for an order to compel

discovery from either a party or nonparty.
25

relevant photographs, videos, postings, and discussions.64 Defense attorneys may also request
that information on a social networking site be preserved by sending a preservation order to the
site operator.65
In circumstances where an employee deactivated or deleted her Facebook or other social
networking account, the site operator may continue to have a record of the user‘s account
information.66 If that information exists, social networking websites‘ privacy policies, including
64

See Blank, supra note 19, at 504 (―Social networking Web sites are subject to subpoena just

like any other business or person. As the custodian of records, subpoenaing the social networking
site itself may be the best way to gain the information sought from the employee.‖). The
subpoena should be very specific, including the user‘s full name, birthday, e-mail addresses, and
time period of the requested activity.
65

See Lori Paul, Paralegal Practice Tip: How to Subpoena MySpace and Facebook Information,

PARALEGAL BLAW BLAW BLAW (Oct. 10, 2009), http://lorijpaul.com/?tag=litigation. Although
sending a preservation order allows the site operator to identify a user‘s account in order to
preserve information, a site operator cannot provide this information to a defense attorney
without a valid subpoena or permission of the user. See id. The preservation order, however, can
ensure a site operator retains access to an employee‘s social networking profile information even
after the employee deletes or loses access to his or her account. See id.
66

See, e.g., Privacy Policy: Deactivating or Deleting Your Account, FACEBOOK,

http://www.facebook.com/policy.php (last visited Aug. 21, 2010) (―If you want to stop using
your account you may deactivate it or delete it. When you deactivate an account, no user will be
able to see it, but it will not be deleted. We save your profile information (connections, photos,
etc.) in case you later decide to reactivate your account. Many users deactivate their accounts for
26

temporary reasons and in doing so are asking us to maintain their information until they return to
Facebook. You will still have the ability to reactivate your account and restore your profile in its
entirety.‖). Facebook also provides an option for users to delete an account permanently. Even
after a user requests to delete his or her account, Facebook retains the account information for an
undisclosed period of time, and may save information indefinitely. See Privacy: Deactivating,
Deleting, and Memorializing Accounts, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/help/?page=842
(last visited Aug. 21, 2010) (―Our system delays the deletion process in case you change your
mind and no longer want to permanently delete your account.‖); see also Facebook‘s Privacy
Policy: Limitations on Removal, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/policy.php (last visited
Aug. 21, 2010) (―Additionally, we may retain certain information to prevent identity theft and
other misconduct even if deletion has been requested.‖); Maria Aspan, After Stumbling,
Facebook Finds a Working Eraser, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2008, at C5, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/18/business/18facebook.html?_r=1 (stating that deleting a
Facebook account can be a very difficult and drawn-out process, and ―[a]fter deletion, there may
still be a record in Facebook‘s archives‖); Jack Zemlicka, Don‘t Forget Social Median in EDiscovery, WISC. L.J. (Mar. 31, 2010),
http://www.wislawjournal.com/article.cfm/2010/04/05/Dont-forget-social-media-in-ediscovery
(discussing destruction of electronic evidence and stating that ―Facebook and Twitter retain user
pages‖).
27

those of Facebook and MySpace, specifically allow the social networking provider to disclose
user information in response to subpoenas or court orders.67
Courts have upheld subpoenas to social networking site operators ―when the discovery
sought is relevant to the lawsuit.‖68 Obtaining social networking information from the site
operator, however, would likely be a very lengthy and costly process, contrary to workers‘
compensation‘s underlying goal of efficiency.69 Therefore, obtaining such information from the
site operator would rarely be worth the cost and time to defense counsel. This option, however,
serves as a check on the employee‘s ability to destroy or hide social networking information in a
workers‘ compensation case and provides for more honest disclosure by employees.
Two potential defenses that employees70 and social networking site operators alike have
to the production of employee information and communications by site operators are that (i) the
67

See Awsumb, supra note 4, at 24 (―The privacy policies of many service providers, including

Facebook and MySpace, permit the disclosure of user information in response to subpoenas or
court orders.‖).
68

See Blank, supra note 19, at 504–05. In Ledbetter v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., an employment law

case, the magistrate judge upheld a subpoena to Facebook and MySpace requiring them to
produce user information because the information sought was ―reasonably calculated to lead to
discovery of admissible evidence.‖ No. 06-cv-01958-WYD-MJW, 2009 WL1067018, at *2 (D.
Colo. Apr. 21, 2009).
69

See supra note 6 and accompanying text.

70

While generally a party in litigation does not have standing to object to a subpoena served on a

non-party to the action, it appears that an employee has standing to object to a subpoena duces
tecum that defense counsel serves on a third-party site operator to the extent that defense counsel
28

employee information and communications are protected by the Stored Communications Act;
and (ii) an employee has a privacy interest in her social networking information and
communications that precludes disclosure by the site operator.71 We analyze each of these
defenses in turn.
1.

Stored Communications Act

Congress enacted the Stored Communications Act (―SCA‖)72 in 1986, as part of the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act,73 to address voluntary and compelled disclosure of
―stored wire and electronic communications and transactional records‖ by internet service
providers. Congress did so negatively, defining first what was not allowed, with exceptions for

seeks personal information or communications of the employee protected by the Stored
Communications Act. See, e.g., J.T. Shannon Lumber Co. v. Gilco Lumber Co., No. 2:07-CV119, 2008 WL 3833216, at *1 (N.D. Aug. 14, 2008) (holding that employee has standing to seek
to quash subpoena served on internet service provider for production of employee‘s personal
information protected by the Stored Communications Act), cited in Crispin v. Christian
Audigier, Inc., No. CV-09-09509 MMM (JEMx), 2010 WL 2293238, at *5 (C.D. Cal. May 26,
2010) (same).
71

The employee could raise this second defense in response to a discovery request she receives

from defense counsel to produce information and communications stored on a social networking
site. See supra Part II.A.3. But because, at least in the published case law, an employee has used
that defense only when discovery has been sought from the site operator, we analyze it here.
72

18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2712 (2006).

73

Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986).
29

what was, rather than defining what was permissible, with exceptions for what was not.74
Congress also repeatedly distinguished between an ―electronic communication service‖ (―ECS‖)
provider and a ―remote computing service‖ (―RCS‖) provider, delineating disclosure prohibitions
for each type of service.75 This distinction has given courts headaches, as they attempt to decide
which category describes various electronic communications, with varying results.76 Social
networking sites provide a unique challenge, since they are neither purely e-mail-centered (like
hotmail), nor purely community-based (like electronic bulletin boards).77
74

For example, subsection (a) of section 2702 states first, ―Prohibitions. Except as provided in

subsection (b) or (c)—a person or entity providing an electronic communication service to the
public shall not knowingly divulge . . . .‖ 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a). Subsection (b) is titled
―Exceptions for disclosure of communications.‖ Id. § 2702(b).
75

―[The term] ‗electronic communication service‘ means any service which provides to users

thereof the ability to send or receive wire or electronic communications.‖ 18 U.S.C. § 2510(15).
―[T]he term ‗remote computing service‘ means the provision to the public of computer storage or
processing services by means of an electronic communications system.‖ 18 U.S.C. § 2711(2).
76

See Crispin, 2010 WL 2293238, at *13–15 (discussing cases with divergent holdings).

77

See id. at *9; see also id. at *14 (―[T]he difficulty in interpreting the statute is ‗compounded by

the fact that the [SCA] was written prior to the advent of the Internet and the World Wide Web.
As a result, the existing statutory framework is ill-suited to address modern forms of
communication like [Facebook and MySpace]. Courts have struggled to analyze problems
involving modern technology within the confines of this statutory framework, often with
unsatisfying results.‘‖ (quoting Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868, 874 (9th Cir.
2002)); Blank, supra note 19, at 488 (―The existence of social networking Web sites challenges
30

It appears that courts have reached a consensus that social networking sites, despite their
variation in function, are ECS providers to the extent they provide private messaging and the
messages have not been opened. Outlining the precedent it followed, one court remarked that,
since an ECS provider is ―any service which provides to users thereof the ability to send or
receive wire or electronic communications,‖ and ―all three [social networking] sites [(Facebook,
MySpace, and Media Temple)] provide private messaging or email services, the court is
compelled to . . . [hold] . . . that such services constitute ECS.‖ 78 Once the private e-mails have
been opened by the recipient, the social networking site operator is functioning as a ―remote
computer service‖ provider, storing the messages for the recipient.79 Whether the social
networking sites are operating as an ECS or RCS provider as to any particular message at any
particular time, they cannot disclose an employee‘s communications without permission of the
employee.80
The one court that has decided the precise issue of whether personal information and
communications on social networking sites are protected by the SCA said that social networking
sites are alternatively either an ECS or RCS with regard to posts on message or bulletin boards or
a user‘s Facebook ―wall‖—regardless of which the social networking sites are in this particular
circumstance, they cannot disclose posts to an employee‘s message board or ―wall‖ in a workers‘

the current mechanisms of e-discovery, and it remains unknown whether litigants may require an
employer to provide information about employees‘ social networking activity.‖).
78

Crispin, 2010 WL 2293238, at *9.

79

Id. at *13.

80

See 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a).
31

compensation case without permission of the employee.81 However, if there are no privacy
settings protecting the employee‘s social networking profile, such that her message board or
―wall‖ is available to the public,82 the SCA would not apply.83
Social networking site operators can disclose employee information or communications
to defense counsel with permission of the employee.84 The SCA allows site operators to ―divulge
81

See Crispin, 2010 WL 2293238, at *14–16.

82

Cf. Indep. Newspapers, Inc. v. Brodie, 966 A.2d 432, 438 n.3 (Md. Ct. App. 2009) (―Social

networking sites and blogs are sophisticated tools of communication where the user voluntarily
provides information that the user wants to share with others. Web sites, such as Facebook and
MySpace, allow the user to tightly control the dissemination of that information. The user can
choose what information to provide or can choose not to provide information. The act of posting
information on a social networking site, without the poster limiting access to that information,
makes whatever is posted available to the world at large.‖).
83

See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(g)(1) (―It shall not be unlawful under this chapter or chapter 121 of

this title for any person—(i) to intercept or access an electronic communication made through an
electronic communication system that is so configured so that such communication is readily
accessible to the general public.‖).
84

See, e.g., Barnes v. CUS Nashville, LLC, No. 3:09-0764, 2010 WL 2196591, at *1 (M.D.

Tenn. May 27, 2010) (―Facebook does point out that it is willing to provide information from its
files with the consent of [the user]. . . . [T]here was some indication that [said user] would be
willing to sign a consent for this material to be furnished to the Magistrate Judge for review. If
that in fact could be accomplished, then future problems concerning potential access to this
material could be avoided.‖); Mackelprang v. Fidelity Nat‘l Title Agency of Nev., Inc., No. 2:0632

a record or other information pertaining to a subscriber to or customer of such service (not
including the contents of communications covered by subsection (a)(1) or (a)(2))‖ with the
customer‘s consent.85 So, for example, if an employee has deleted her account but authorizes a
social networking site operator to release her information and communications to defense
counsel, the site operator can do so. Additionally, it might even be possible in the case of an
employee‘s prosecution of a workers‘ compensation claim for the judge to compel the employee
to sign a consent for the release of her account information and communications from a site
operator, if relevant to the employee‘s claim.86 It is more likely that a judge would not do so,
however, and weigh the employee‘s failure to consent to the release of the information in his or
her evaluation of the employee‘s claim.
2.

Privacy

cv-00788-JCM-GWF, 2007 WL 119149, at *2 (D. Nev. Jan. 9, 2007) (―In response to the
subpoena, MySpace.com produced certain ‗public‘ information regarding the two accounts, but
refused to produce private email messages on either account in the absence of a search warrant or
a letter of consent to production by the owner of the account.‖).
85

18 U.S.C. § 2702(c).

86

See, e.g., Grady v. Superior Court, 139 Cal. App. 4th 1423, 1446 (2006) (―Where a party to the

communication is also a party to the litigation, it would seem within the power of a court to
consent to disclosure on pain of discovery sanctions.‖); see also Bruce Nye, More About
Facebook: How to Get Facebook Records in the Litigation Arena, CAL BIZ LIT (Aug. 24, 2009,
6:00 AM), http://www.calbizlit.com/cal_biz_lit/2009/08/more-about-facebook-how-to-getfacebook-records-in-the-litigation-arena.html.
33

While an employee could argue that she has a privacy interest in her social networking
profile information precluding disclosure, that argument is likely to fail in workers‘
compensation courts.87 It is undisputed in the case law that an individual has no reasonable
expectation of privacy in whether she has an account with a social networking site or internet
service provider: ―[A] person has no expectation of privacy in Internet subscriber information. . .
. [This is consistent with] settled federal law that a person has no reasonable expectation of
privacy in information exposed to third parties, like a telephone company or bank.‖88 An
87

See Blank, supra note 19, at 510 (―When employees place information on the Internet without

taking measures to protect the information, the employee does not have a legitimate expectation
of privacy in such information because the Internet is a public medium. A person cannot
maintain a subjective belief that information placed on the Internet will be kept private since
such actions show the person wishes to waive their privacy interest. Most notably, one court has
suggested that even when protectionist measures, such as password-protecting access to
materials placed on the Internet, are taken, the materials are not considered private because they
could be accessed by the public.‖ (citing United States v. Gines-Perez, 214 F. Supp. 2d 205, 225
(D.P.R. 2002))). Any right to privacy the employee has is not absolute. In the workers‘
compensation context, it is likely that an overriding objective is ―facilitating the ascertainment of
truth in connection with legal proceedings.‖ See Kahn v. Superior Court, 188 Cal. App. 3d 752,
765 (1987).
88

Courtright v. Madigan, No. 09-cv-208-JPG, 2009 WL 3713654, at *2 (S.D. Ill. Nov. 4, 2009)

(―The logic of these cases extends to subscriber information revealed by Plaintiff to
MySpace.com. In sum, because Plaintiff had no reasonable expectation that the fact or existence
of his MySpace.com account would remain private, neither the request by the Attorney General‘s
34

employee likewise does not have a privacy interest in what she posts to her profile on a social
networking site.89 Even if the employee protects her information on a social networking site with
privacy settings, she still does not have a privacy interest in what is posted or communicated to
or through her account.90

Office for that information nor the disclosure of that information by MySpace.com violated
Plaintiff‘s Fourth Amendment rights.‖); see also Doe v. Shurtleff, No. 1:08-CV-64-TC, 2009
WL 2601458, at *5 (D. Utah Aug. 20, 2009) (―In Perrine, for example, when law enforcement
obtained records from Yahoo! linking a screen name to an IP address registered to the defendant,
the Tenth Circuit held that the Fourth Amendment was not implicated because the defendant had
no expectation of privacy in information he had voluntarily transmitted to a third-party Internet
provider.‖ (citing United States v. Perrine, 518 F.3d 1196, 1199, 1204 (10th Cir. 2008))).
89

See Moreno v. Hanford Sentinel, Inc., 91 Cal. Rptr. 3d 858, 863–64 (Ct. App. 2009) (holding

that an ode posted on MySpace.com was considered sufficiently public that the poster waived
any
privacy interest in the online rant).
90

See Blank, supra note 19, at 511 (―Even if a user restricts access to their information through

the site‘s privacy settings, most social networking sites warn users that they cannot control how
recipients may distribute their information. The possibility of inadvertently publicizing ‗private‘
user content on social networking Web sites makes an objective expectation of privacy
unreasonable.‖ (footnote omitted)); see also Nye, supra note 86 (―So, bottom line: social
networking posts may not be private at all; if they are, the privacy right is not absolute, and the
defense can overcome the privacy protection by demonstrating their relevance. . . . [O]nce that is
35

III.

PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY ISSUES IN DISCOVERY OF EMPLOYEE INFORMATION
FROM SOCIAL NETWORKING SITES

This Part explores issues of professional responsibility that arise for a plaintiff‘s attorney
and defense counsel in connection with an employee maintaining and producing, and defense
counsel discovering, information about an employee stored on a social networking site.
A.

PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE PLAINTIFF‘S ATTORNEY

Plaintiffs‘ attorneys should advise their clients of the risks of posting information and
photographs, and communicating through, social networking sites.91 Employees should not post
any information or photographs that they do not want the employer or insurance company‘s

done, the court has the authority to require the plaintiff to sign an authorization or release, and at
that point, Facebook, MySpace or whomever will have to respond to a subpoena.‖).
91

See, e.g., Floridians with Workers‘ Compensation and Personal Injury Cases Should Be

Cautious When Posting on Social Networking Sites Like Facebook, JOHNSON & GILBERT, P.A.,
http://www.mylegalneeds.com/library/facebook-posts-could-damage-your-florida-workerscomp-or-pi-case.cfm (last visited June 7, 2010) (―However, there are some precautions you can
take to protect yourself, short of boycotting the Internet all together. First, be vigilant in
reviewing the photos and posts on your social networking site. Remove anything that you would
not want an insurance company lawyer to see that could help defend against your case. Next,
[c]heck your privacy settings which enable you to block certain people from seeing you on a
particular site (Facebook allows this). It is also helpful to search your name in the search field
and see what comes up to make sure it is acceptable (it is advisable to do this on Google and
YouTube as well). Finally never accept friend requests or respond to emails from people you do
not know.‖).
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lawyer to know or see—such as descriptions or pictures of the employee engaging in physical
activities92—and not provide anyone who they do not know access to their profiles.93
Additionally, counsel should advise their clients not to post days and times of activities, as that
could give investigators additional opportunities to conduct surveillance.94 Of course, to the
extent the workers‘ compensation claim is fraudulent and the lawyer knows so, the lawyer
cannot represent the client in the prosecution of her claim.95 But the mere fact that an employee‘s
92

See supra notes 27–29 and accompanying text.

93

See, e.g., supra note 33.

94

See Ceniceros, supra note 29 (―It‘s common for claimants to load their social networking sites

with dates, easing the way for investigators and their cameras to find them.‖).
95

See MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (2009) (―A lawyer shall not counsel a client

to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent, but a
lawyer may discuss the legal consequences of any proposed course of conduct with a client and
may counsel or assist a client to make a good faith effort to determine the validity, scope,
meaning or application of the law.‖); id. R. 4.1(b) (―In the course of representing a client a
lawyer shall not knowingly: . . . (b) fail to disclose a material fact to a third person when
disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by a client, unless
disclosure is prohibited by Rule 1.6.‖). As one plaintiff‘s attorney commented in response to
learning of a non-client plaintiff whose personal injury case was destroyed by information
defense counsel learned of on Facebook, ―The plaintiff was dishonest, and as a personal injury
attorney I don‘t want anything to do with representing dishonest people. In fact, I tell my clients,
I can always deal with the truth but a single lie can kill an otherwise good case.‖ When Facebook
Isn‘t a ‗Friend‘ to Your Personal Injury Case, NY INJURY LAW BLOG (July 1, 2009, 12:34 PM
37

information or photographs on a social networking site contradict the plaintiff‘s claim does not
mean an employee‘s claim is fraudulent, because often interpretation of what a person posts on a
social networking site depends on its context.96 A plaintiff‘s attorney also needs to keep in mind
that although a lawyer ―generally has no affirmative duty to inform an opposing counsel of
relevant facts,‖97 the employee‘s lawyer might have an obligation to provide relevant
information or photographs to a defense attorney in response to an interrogatory, document
request, or other form of discovery demand, if the plaintiff can still access what the defense
attorney seeks.98
However, plaintiff‘s counsel cannot advise his or her client to delete information or
photographs stored on a social networking site to the extent that what is stored on the site is
potentially relevant to the employee‘s claim. According to Model Rule 3.4, ―A lawyer shall not
[‗counsel or assist another person to‘]: (a) unlawfully obstruct another party‘s access to evidence
EST), http://www.zifflaw.com/NYInjuryLawBlog/personal-injury-victims-cautious-facebookprivacy.
96

See Jodi Ginsberg, How Facebook Can Undermine Your Workers‘ Compensation Case, GA.

WORKERS COMPENSATION BLOG (July 11, 2009),
http://www.georgiaworkerscompblog.com/2009/07/11/how-facebook-can-undermine-yourworkers-compensation-case/ (―Photos and updates can easily be taken out of context. Even your
frequency of posting can be used as evidence that you have the capacity to perform clerical type
of work. Posts on Facebook and other social media sites can be used against use to put you on
the defensive and as leverage to reduce the value of your case.‖).
97

MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 4.1 cmt. 1.

98

See supra notes 37–39 and accompanying text.
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or unlawfully alter, destroy or conceal a document or other material having potential evidentiary
value.‖99 The Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers counsels similarly: ―A lawyer
may not destroy or obstruct another party‘s access to documentary or other evidence when doing
so would violate a court order or other legal requirements, or counsel or assist a client to do
so.‖100 Consequently, the employee‘s attorney should advise his or her client to proceed with
caution in posting information to a social networking site, but should not advise the client to
destroy information that already exists when the attorney assumes representation of the
employee.
B.

PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF DEFENSE COUNSEL

There could be a lot of information relevant to an employee‘s workers‘ compensation
case publicly available on Facebook or another social networking site,101 and defense counsel
could find it because many potential plaintiffs in workers‘ compensation cases do not protect
their profiles with increased privacy settings.102 There is nothing unethical about a defense
99

MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 3.4(a); see id. R. 3.4 cmt. 2 (―Documents and other

items of evidence are often essential to establish a claim or defense. Subject to evidentiary
privileges, the right of an opposing party, including the government, to obtain evidence through
discovery or subpoena is an important procedural right. The exercise of that right can be
frustrated if relevant material is altered, concealed or destroyed.‖).
100

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 118(2) (2000).

101

See supra notes 27–29 and accompanying text.

102

See John Browning, What Lawyers Need to Know About Social Networking Sites, DALLAS

BAR ASS‘N NEWS (Feb. 1, 2009), http://www.dallasbar.org/about/news-archives.asp?ID=240
(―While both MySpace and Facebook feature various privacy settings and controls, enabling
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attorney or an agent of the attorney accessing an employee‘s information and photographs stored
on a social networking site that are not protected with privacy settings that block public
access.103 The employee would have no privacy interest in the information and photographs she
has posted.104 Scouring the internet for publicly available information on a social networking site
is no different than the video surveillance in a public place that defense counsel may authorize in
a workers‘ compensation case,105 and has actually replaced video surveillance as a popular form

users to restrict certain information from public view, studies have shown that a surprisingly high
percentage of users are unfamiliar with the protection afforded by these settings.‖).
103

See Moreno v. Hanford Sentinel, Inc., 91 Cal. Rptr. 3d 858, 862 (Ct. App. 2009) (―Here,

Cynthia publicized her opinions about Coalinga by posting the Ode on MySpace.com, a hugely
popular Internet site. Cynthia‘s affirmative act made her article available to any person with a
computer and thus opened it to the public eye. Under these circumstances, no reasonable person
would have had an expectation of privacy regarding the published material.‖).
104

See id.

105

See Mara E. Zazzali-Hogan & Jennifer Marino Thibodaux, Friend or Foe: Ethical Issues for

Lawyers to Consider When ‗Friending‘ Adverse Witnesses Online, 197 N.J.L.J. 726, 726 (2009)
(―A good rule of thumb for attorneys before poking around cyberspace is to consider whether an
analogous noncyberspace situation would raise concerns. For example, viewing the public
portion of a person‘s MySpace page or his post on a public message board is analogous to
conducting surveillance on a subject. In both instances, there is no communication made with the
person, nor is any misrepresentation made about the investigating individual‘s identity. The
conduct would not invade a zone of privacy in either circumstance. Similarly, videotaping
someone walking down the street, such as a plaintiff in a personal injury case, is akin to printing
40

of investigation.106 It should be routine for defense counsel (or, at minimum, the insurance
company) to search the internet, at least in a popular search engine such as Yahoo! or Google,
for information that is publicly available about an employee.107

out information a person publicly posts online for all to see. The videotape or printout is a record
of what that person has held out to the public.‖). Also, the Professional Guidance Committee of
the Philadelphia Bar Association said that there is nothing unethical about a lawyer, or an agent
of a lawyer, forthrightly asking a witness (who is not represented by an attorney) for access to
her social networking profile. Phila. Bar Ass‘n Prof‘l Guidance Comm., Op. 2009-02, at 1 (Mar.
2009), available at
http://www.philadelphiabar.org/WebObjects/PBAReadOnly.woa/Contents/WebServerResources
/CMSResources/Opinion_2009-2.pdf [hereinafter Op. 2009-02] (―The inquirer could test that by
simply asking the witness forthrightly for access. That would not be deceptive and would of
course be permissible.‖). However, the lawyer could not ask an employee, represented by an
attorney, for such access without going through the employee‘s attorney. See MODEL RULES OF
PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 4.2 (2009) (―In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate about
the subject of the representation with a person the lawyer knows to be represented by another
lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer or is authorized to do
so by law or a court order.‖).
106

See Ceniceros, supra note 29 (―‗It‘s the new video camera,‘ Pierre Khoury, a special

investigator for Harleysville Group Inc., a Harleysville, Pennsylvania-based insurer, says of the
social networking sites. ‗Now we have a new kind of video camera, but we are not actually the
ones filming. They are filming it for us.‘‖).
41

But what about information or photographs on a social networking site regarding an
employee that are not publicly available because the employee has them protected with security
settings?108 Can an attorney direct a third-party agent to ―friend‖ the employee in hopes of
gathering relevant evidence about the plaintiff?109 A Philadelphia Bar Association opinion
addressed a similar question.110 The inquirer-attorney asked about the propriety of an agent
―friending‖ an unrepresented non-party witness on Facebook and MySpace, whose testimony

107

Cf. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (―A lawyer shall provide competent

representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill,
thoroughness, and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.‖).
108

See Denise Howell & Ernie Svenson, Ins and Outs of Social Networking for Lawyers: How

Tough Is It to Cast Your Profile Into Infinity?, L. PRAC. MAG., Jan. 2008, at 47, 48 (―One
important difference is the functionality of the sites‘ privacy controls. For those who take the
time to examine and tweak their privacy settings, Facebook makes it possible to funnel certain
information only to certain parties.‖).
109

―Dissembling‖ or ―pretexting,‖ whatever the medium, is the practice of a lawyer or a lawyer‘s

subordinate either pretending to be someone he or she is not, lying, or being deceitful about his
or her intentions, all for the purpose of obtaining information from an adverse party or witness.
See Eric Cooperstein, Facebook Ethics: It‘s Not About Facebook, LAWYERIST.COM (June 23,
2009), http://lawyerist.com/facebook-ethics-it%E2%80%99s-not-about-facebook/.
110

Op. 2009-02, supra note 105, at 1. In general, there is a lack of authority on these questions.

See, e.g., Zazzali-Hogan & Thibodaux, supra note 105 (noting that there is no New Jersey
authority on point).
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was adverse to the inquirer‘s client.111 The inquirer stated that the agent would state only truthful
information—e.g., she would use her real name—but would not state her affiliation with the
attorney.112 The inquirer wanted the agent to provide him with access to the witness‘s profiles on
MySpace and Facebook because ―the inquirer believed that the pages maintained by the witness
contained information relevant to the matter in which the witness was deposed, and could be
used to impeach the witness‘s testimony should she testify at trial.‖113
First, the opinion states, under Pennsylvania Rule of Professional Conduct 5.3,114 which
is identical to Model Rule 5.3,115 that an attorney is responsible for the conduct of a non-lawyer
who ―friends‖ the employee on the attorney‘s behalf. According to the opinion:

111

Op. 2009-02, supra note 105, at 1.

112

Id.

113

Id.

114

Rule 5.3 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct provides, in part:
With respect to a nonlawyer employed or retained by or associated with a lawyer:
....
(c) a lawyer shall be responsible for conduct of [a nonlawyer over whom the

lawyer has ―direct supervisory authority‖] that would be a violation of the Rules of
Professional Conduct if engaged in by a lawyer if:
(1) the lawyer orders or, with the knowledge of the specific conduct,
ratifies the conduct involved; . . . .
PA. RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 5.3 (2009).
115

See MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 5.3 (2009).
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But the inquirer plainly is procuring the conduct, and, if it were undertaken, would be
ratifying it with full knowledge of its propriety or lack thereof, as evidenced by the fact
that he wisely is seeking guidance from this Committee. Therefore, he is responsible for
the conduct under the Rules even if he is not himself engaging in the actual conduct that
may violate a rule.116
The bar association does not distinguish between the activities of an investigator or paralegal and
the activities of a junior lawyer who the lawyer handling the case is supervising.117
The lawyer is not responsible under Model Rule 5.3 for the actions of an investigator
hired by the client who ―friended‖ an employee as long as the investigator was not ―employed,

116

Op. 2009-02, supra note 105, at 2. Another employee of the employer, such as the employee‘s

supervisor, could already be ―friends‖ with the plaintiff-employee, in which case the other
employee could voluntarily, or be compelled to, share information with defense counsel that the
plaintiff has posted on a social networking site. If the other employee is unrepresented, defense
counsel cannot misrepresent that she is uninterested. See MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R.
4.3 (―In dealing on behalf of a client with a person who is not represented by counsel, a lawyer
shall not state or imply that the lawyer is disinterested. When the lawyer knows or reasonably
should know that the unrepresented person misunderstands the lawyer‘s role in the matter, the
lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to correct the misunderstanding.‖).
117

See Op. 2009-02, supra note 105, at 3; see also MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 5.1(b)

(―A lawyer having direct supervisory authority over another lawyer shall make reasonable efforts
to ensure that the other lawyer conforms to the Rules of Professional Conduct.‖).
44

retained, or associated by the attorney.‖118 Additionally, the communication between the
investigator and the employee would be communication between parties, not between an
attorney and an opposing party, and it would therefore not be prohibited by Model Rule 4.2.119
Consequently, defense counsel in a workers‘ compensation case is not acting unethically if an
investigator hired by the insurance company ―friends‖ an employee on a social networking site,
as long as the lawyer does not encourage the investigator to do so and is not associated with her,
and defense counsel could potentially use the information or photographs that the investigator
uncovers in defending the employee‘s claim.120 It is not relevant to the lawyer‘s culpability
whether the investigator used her real identity or not: what is critical is the lack of any
relationship between the lawyer and the investigator.
Second, the Philadelphia Bar Association opinion states that the attorney‘s proposed
conduct violates Pennsylvania Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4(c),121 the same as Model Rule
118

See State Bar of Mich., MI Ethics Op. RI-153 (1993) (citing MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L

CONDUCT R. 5.3), available at 1993 WL 274201. In the scenarios described in the Michigan
ethics opinion, insurance investigators used pretexts to film workers‘ compensation claimants
acting inconsistently with their claimed injuries. Because the insurance company, and not
defense counsel, hired the investigators, they ―[were] agents of the company, not agents of the
lawyers,‖ and the investigators ―[were] not encompassed by the professional rules applicable to
lawyers.‖ See id. at 2.
119

See id. (citing MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 4.2).

120

See infra Part IV.

121

Rule 8.4 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct provides, in part:
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
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8.4(c).122 According to the opinion, it is deceptive for a non-lawyer working on defense
counsel‘s behalf to attempt to access an employee‘s profile on a social networking site while
omitting a material fact—―that the third party who asks to be allowed access to the witness‘s
pages is doing so only because he or she is intent on obtaining information and sharing it with a
lawyer for use in a lawsuit to impeach the testimony of the witness.‖123 The fact that the witness
might permit anyone to access her profile does not excuse deceit.124 The Professional Guidance

....
(c)

engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.

PA. RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 8.4(c) (2009).
122

See MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 8.4(c).

123

Op. 2009-02, supra note 105, at 3 (―The omission would purposefully conceal that fact from

the witness for the purpose of inducing the witness to allow access when she may not do so if she
knew the third person was associated with the inquirer and the true purpose of the access was to
obtain information for the purpose of impeaching her testimony.‖).
124

Id. (―The possibility or even the certainty that the witness would permit access to her pages to

a person not associated with the inquirer who provided no more identifying information than
would be provided by the third person associated with the lawyer does not change the
Committee‘s conclusion. Even if, by allowing virtually all would-be ‗friends‘ onto her Facebook
and MySpace pages, the witness is exposing herself to risks like that in this case, excusing the
deceit on that basis would be improper. Deception is deception, regardless of the victim‘s
wariness in her interactions on the internet and susceptibility to being deceived. The fact that
access to the pages may readily be obtained by others who either are or are not deceiving the
46

Committee distinguishes the inquiry before it from the ordinary surveillance context—in the
latter the videographer films, photographs, or observes the employee as she presents herself to
the public and does not have to ask permission to gain access to a private area.125 The inquirer of
witness, and that the witness is perhaps insufficiently wary of deceit by unknown internet users,
does not mean that deception at the direction of the inquirer is ethical.‖).
125

See id.; see also Zazzali-Hogan & Thibodaux, supra note 105, at 726 (―The waters are

muddied, however, when an attorney‘s concealment of the facts becomes a variable in the
equation. The hypothetical we present is problematic because the paralegal attempting to ‗friend‘
the subject would not disclose his relationship with the attorney and true intentions. The
paralegal‘s conduct is more invasive than simple surveillance but more importantly, it would
occur under false pretenses. An analogy outside of the cyberspace context is if the paralegal
knocked on the party‘s door; the party, without questioning the visitor‘s background or motives,
allowed him to come inside; and, they engaged in a discussion that included information relevant
to the lawsuit. While the party‘s voluntary act of allowing the paralegal to enter her home—like
the party‘s voluntary acceptance of an online invitation to become ‗friends‘—may mitigate
invasion of privacy concerns and call into question the party‘s discretion, the element of
deception still exists. Until a New Jersey court or ethics committee makes a clear
pronouncement, all attorneys should exercise caution before becoming ‗friendly‘ with adverse
witnesses or parties on social networking sites.‖); Clifford F. Shnier, Friend or Foe?: Social
Networking and E-Discovery, INSIDE COUNS. (Feb. 26, 2010),
http://www.insidecounsel.com/Issues/2010/February-2010/Pages/Friend-or-Foe--Socialnetworking=and-EDiscovery.aspx?page=1 (―If a personal injury defense attorney hires an
investigator to take videos of a plaintiff who claims he is incapacitated due to injury, and the
47

the Philadelphia Bar Association opinion proposed that his agent use a truthful identify;126 one
issue that arises is whether the lawyer‘s conduct runs more unquestionably afoul of Rule 8.4(c) if
the lawyer instructs an agent to use a false identity in trying to ―friend‖ an employee. While there
is no authority on this latter point, it certainly appears that such conduct is ―deceitful.‖
Last, the opinion states that a non-lawyer who friends an adverse witness at the direction
of an attorney violates Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct 4.1127 and 8.4(a)128 as

investigator catches that plaintiff playing basketball, few courts would disallow that evidence
and none would see any reason to discipline the defense attorney. However, if that same defense
attorney asks his assistant to ‗friend‘ the plaintiff on Facebook, so as to obtain information that
the plaintiff doesn‘t make available on his page to nonfriends, that crosses the ethical line.‖).
126

Op. 2009-02, supra note 105, at 2.

127

PA. RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 4.1(a) (2009) (―In the course of representing a client, a

lawyer shall not knowingly: (a) make a false statement of material fact or law to a third person . .
. .‖); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 4.1(a) (same); Browning, supra note 102
(―In instances where it is not readily available, beware the ethical pitfalls that lie in attempting to
obtain access to such non-public material. Misrepresenting who you are in order to become a
‗friend‘ and gain access could be considered a violation of Rule 4.01 of the Professional Rules of
Conduct.‖).
128

PA. RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 8.4(a) (―It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to (a)

violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce
another to do so, or do so through the acts of another . . . .‖); see MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L
CONDUCT R. 8.4(a) (same); see also In re Luther, 374 N.W.2d 720, 720 (1984) (reprimanding
48

well.129 The opinion notes that states differ on whether lawyers and their agents can engage in
deception in certain types of investigations.130 Even in states such as Oregon, that have an
lawyer for violating DR-102(A)(4) and (6) in using false identity to gain information about
debtors to initiate debt collection suits on behalf of his creditor-client).
129

Op. 2009-02, supra note 105, at 4.

130

See id. at 4–6. Compare OR. RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 8.4(b) (2009) (―Notwithstanding

paragraphs (a)(1), (3) and (4) and Rule 3.3(a)(1), it shall not be professional misconduct for a
lawyer to advise clients or others about or to supervise lawful covert activity in the investigation
of violations of civil or criminal law or constitutional rights, provided the lawyer‘s conduct is
otherwise in compliance with these Rules of Professional Conduct. ‗Covert activity,‘ as used in
this rule, means an effort to obtain information on unlawful activity through the use of
misrepresentations or other subterfuge.‖); IOWA RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 32:8.4 cmt. 6
(2009) (―It is not professional misconduct for a lawyer to advise clients or others about or to
supervise or participate in lawful covert activity in the investigation of violations of civil or
criminal law or constitutional rights or in lawful intelligence-gathering activity, provided the
lawyer‘s conduct is otherwise in compliance with these rules.‖); N.Y. City Lawyers‘ Ass‘n
Comm. on Prof‘l Ethics, Formal Op. No. 737 (2007), available at
http://www.nycla.org/siteFiles/Publications/Publications519_0.pdf (distinguishing
―dissemblance‖ from ―dishonesty, fraud, misrepresentation, and deceit‖ and allowing lawyers to
use deceit in investigations of intellectual property and civil rights violations where no rights of
third parties are involved, the risk of harm is imminent, no other means exists to obtain the
necessary evidence, and the lawyer‘s and investigator‘s conduct do not otherwise violate the
ethical rules, including the no-contact rule); Apple Corps Ltd. v. Int‘l Collectors Soc‘y, 15 F.
49

Supp. 2d 456, 475 (D.N.J. 1998) (―However, RPC 8.4(c) does not apply to misrepresentations
solely as to identity or purpose and solely for evidence-gathering purposes. . . . The prevailing
understanding in the legal profession is that a public or private lawyer‘s use of an undercover
investigator to detect ongoing violations of the law is not ethically proscribed, especially when it
would be difficult to discover the violations by other means.‖), with In re Pautler, 47 P.3d 1175,
1176 (Colo. 2002) (―In this proceeding, we reaffirm that members of our profession must adhere
to the highest moral and ethical standards. Those standards apply regardless of motive.
Purposeful deception by an attorney licensed in our state is intolerable, even when it is
undertaken as a part of attempting to secure the surrender of a murder suspect.‖). Perhaps, in a
jurisdiction such as Iowa or Oregon, it does not violate the Model Rules for a defense lawyer to
supervise a third party who ―friends‖ an employee to gain access to her social networking site if
the lawyer believes that the employee is engaging in unlawful activity, such as prosecuting a
fraudulent workers‘ compensation claim. For more on deception in undercover investigations
under the professional responsibility rules, see generally Barry R. Temkin, Deception in
Undercover Investigations: Conduct-Based v. Status-Based Ethical Analysis, 32 SEATTLE UNIV.
L. REV. 123 (2008); Douglas R. Richmond, Deceptive Lawyering, 74 U. CINN. L. REV. 577
(2005); and David B. Isbell & Lucantonio N. Salvi, Ethical Responsibility of Lawyers for
Deception by Undercover Investigators and Discrimination Testers: An Analysis of the
Provisions Prohibiting Misrepresentation Under the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 8
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 791 (1995). For a criticism of the narrowness of the exception for deceit in
lawyer-supervised investigations in New York, see Gerald B. Lefcourt, Fighting Fire with Fire:
Private Attorneys Using the Same Investigative Techniques as Government Attorneys: The
Ethical and Legal Considerations for Attorneys Conducting Investigations, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV.
50

exception for a lawyer to use deceit in investigations, the lawyer probably cannot use deceit
when there is no violation of law, as is often the case with no-fault workers‘ compensation
claims.131 In some states, a situation where this Philadelphia Bar Association opinion might be
applicable in the workers‘ compensation context, in addition to the case of a fraudulent claim, is
where a non-lawyer ―friends‖ an employee who has a profile on a social networking site that
advertises a business to the public.132

397, 398–403 (2007). For a critique of lawyers hiring investigators to engage in deceit, see
Michael Bonsignore, Note, Rules Exist for a Reason: A Commentary on Lawyers Hiring
Investigators to Partake in Deceptive Tactics, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 655 (2008).
131

Or. State Bar, Or. Ethics Op. 2005-173 (2005), available at 2005 WL 5679600. In the case

where the attorney suspects the plaintiff of breaching a duty, for example by filing a fraudulent
claim, the lawyer can ―advise‖ or ―supervise‖ covert behavior but not directly participate in it.
―[A]ny lawyer involvement in activity that includes the lawyer‘s direct misrepresentation or
deception runs counter to the fundamental tenet of lawyer ‗honesty and personal integrity.‘‖ Id.
(quoting In re Gatti, 8 P.3d 966, 977 (Or. 2000)).
132

Cf. Baumann v. Joyner Silver & Electroplating, 1992 MN Wrk. Comp. LEXIS 622, at *15 n.3

(W.C.C.A. Sept. 1, 2992) (―Among other objections, the employee objected to the surveillance
evidence based, apparently, on the claim the activities of investigators posing as potential
customers for employee‘s self-employed business constituted improper direct communications
between an attorney‘s agent and a represented opposing party. Although we do not here reach
this contention, we note that the surveillance evidence to which employee objects is not in the
record before us. Since, in our view, surveillance contact in which investigators seek to elicit
only information which the employee would normally provide to the public in the course of his
51

Whatever the ethics rules in a particular state, workers‘ compensation judges would have
some discretion in whether they find the efforts of defense counsel and their agents to gain
access to an employee‘s restricted social networking profile deceitful.133 However, evidence can
or her public activities is not proscribed conduct, we would in any event have needed to review
the specifics of the contact during the investigation to determine the presence or absence of
impropriety.‖).
133

Cf., e.g., Rhoades v. Nabisco, Inc., 1985 WL 47399, at *3 (Minn. W.C.C.A. May 14, 1985)

(Gard, J., concurring) (―I would affirm the findings of the Compensation Judge because of the
review standard presently applicable to the Workers‘ Compensation Court of Appeals. I feel it
necessary to comment, however, upon the method used to investigate the case and the contacts
made with the employee after the attorney-client relationship had been established and
published. The majority has concluded that the employers and insurers are entitled to reasonable
investigative and surveillance procedures and, undoubtedly, there are no limitations on the
investigative and surveillance procedures contained in the Workers‘ Compensation Law. There is
the allegation of the use of a hidden camera, a hidden microphone, a meeting established on
pretense or pretext, and the allegation of fraud and deceit. This Court is certainly aware that the
method of investigation and surveillance in workers‘ compensation cases has occasionally
involved such pretext and actual misrepresentation as to the real intention of the party conducting
the surveillance or investigation. It would seem that, in the absence of legislation dealing with
such conduct, that [sic] there be considerable discretion in the trial judge with regard to the
introduction of evidence gathered by such means. I do not believe that the analogy of entrapment
is in any way applicable, since the law with regard to entrapment in a criminal proceeding would
not only not here be applicable, but the conduct here does not constitute entrapment in any
52

be admissible in a workers‘ compensation case even if an attorney violates the rules of
professional responsibility in obtaining it.134 But in certain cases, a court might impose sanctions
and not admit into evidence what a lawyer obtains in violation of the Model Rules.135
event.‖); Clemente-Volpe v. Workmen‘s Compensation Appeal Bd. (Westinghouse Air Brake
Div.), 624 A.2d 666, 672 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1993) (refusing to disturb referee‘s finding that
surveillance film was credible even though employee was ―tricked by the investigators into
performing tasks that required lifting and bending‖); Isadore v. Workers‘ Compensation Appeal
Bd. (Owens-Ill.), 465 A.2d 1096, 1099 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1983) (finding motion pictures admissible
even though investigator tricked employee into performing acts inconsistent with alleged
medical condition).
134

See Keiser v. Dick Lind Heating Co., 1996 WL 705445, at *4 (Minn. W.C.C.A. Nov. 22,

1996) (―This court may not construe or apply non-workers‘ compensation statutes or rules to
determine whether there has been a violation of those statutes or rules. Furthermore, nothing in
the statute or rule cited by the employee [Minnesota Rule of Professional Conduct 4.2] requires
that evidence obtained in contravention of either the statue or the rule be excluded from
admission in a civil proceeding.‖ (footnote omitted)); State Bar of Mich., MI Ethics Op. RI-153
(1993), available at 1993 WL 274201 (―The admissibility of the surveillance results is a question
of law, not ethics, and therefore will not be further considered.‖).
135

See, e.g., Midwest Motor Sports v. Arctic Sales, Inc., 347 F.3d 693, 699–70 (8th Cir. 2003)

(upholding evidentiary sanctions—the exclusion from evidence of conversations obtained in
violation of the Model Rules—against attorney who, in violation of Model Rules 4.2 and 8.4(c),
supervised an investigation where investigators deceitfully posed as customers of the plaintiff
and secretly tape recorded conversations).
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The witness whose social networking profiles the lawyer inquired about accessing in the
Philadelphia Bar Association opinion was not represented by counsel; if an employee is
represented by counsel, then there is risk of the lawyer, or a third party acting under the
supervision of the lawyer, violating Model Rule 4.2 in ―friending‖ the employee. Model Rule 4.2
states, ―In representing a client a lawyer shall not communicate about the subject of the
representation with a person the lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer in the matter,
unless the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer or is authorized do so by law or court
order.‖136 Pursuant to Model Rule 5.3, the lawyer cannot direct a non-lawyer to contact, or
―friend,‖ the employee on the lawyer‘s behalf.137 This is no different than the physical
surveillance context where an attorney who represents the employer and the insurance carrier
potentially violates Model Rule 4.2 if an investigator, who is the attorney‘s agent, engages the
employee in conversation during the course of the investigator‘s surveillance.138

136

MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 4.2 (2009).

137

See supra notes 114–15 and accompanying text.

138

See State Bar of N.C., 2003 NC Ethics Op. 4, available at

http://www.ncbar.gov/ethics/ethics.asp. Whether the information obtained through the prohibited
contact is admissible is a separate question. See id. (―The Ethics Committee declines to opine on
the admissibility of evidence. However, to discourage unauthorized communications by an agent
of a lawyer and to protect the client-lawyer relationship, the lawyer may not proffer the evidence
of the communication with the represented person, even if the lawyer made a reasonable effort to
prevent the contact, unless the lawyer makes full disclosure of the source of the information to
opposing counsel and to the court prior to the proffer of the evidence.‖); see also infra Part IV.
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The same exceptions to the prohibitions in Rule 8.4 that apply in cases where deception is
authorized in particular states would also likely apply here. But little in this area is certain,
because as the technologies develop, so does the application of the ethics rules. What is certain,
however, is that Rules 4.2 and 5.3, in addition to the Philadelphia Bar Association opinion,
suggest, at minimum, that defense counsel should proceed with considerable caution before
having an agent ―friend‖ an employee.139
IV.

USING EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM SOCIAL NETWORKING SITES IN LITIGATION
Despite the prevalence of social networking, there are few published cases discussing the

use of social networking evidence in litigation, and an absence of workers‘ compensation cases.
This Part applies workers‘ compensation law, as well as pertinent state and federal court cases
discussing the admissibility of social networking evidence and other forms of ESI, to offer
guidance on when social networking evidence should be admissible and how judges should
weigh it in workers‘ compensation litigation.
A.

ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE

Workers‘ compensation judges have broad discretion in light of liberal rules of evidence,
including rules as to hearsay and authentication. Despite that discretion, compensation judges
may not disregard all traditional principles of evidence applied by state and federal courts in
deciding whether social networking evidence is admissible.
1.

Maintaining Relevancy Despite Relaxed Admissibility Standards

In state court, when ESI is offered as evidence, judges consider these types of questions:

139

But cf. MI Ethics Op. RI-153 (advising that the lawyer does not violate Model Rule 4.2 when

the client, and not the lawyer, hires and supervises the investigator).
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(1) is the ESI relevant as determined by [Federal] Rule [of Evidence] 401 (does it have
any tendency to make some fact that is of consequence to the litigation more or less
probable than it otherwise would be); (2) if relevant under 401, is it authentic as required
by Rule 901(a) (can the proponent show that the ESI is what it purports to be); (3) if the
ESI is offered for its substantive truth, is it hearsay as defined by Rule 801, and if so, is it
covered by an applicable exception (Rules 803, 804 and 807); (4) is the form of the ESI
that is being offered as evidence an original or duplicate under the original writing rule,
of [sic] if not, is there admissible secondary evidence to prove the content of the ESI
(Rules 1001–1008); and (5) is the probative value of the ESI substantially outweighed by
the danger of unfair prejudice or one of the other factors identified by Rule 403, such
that it should be excluded despite its relevance.140
As use of the internet has become widespread, state courts are becoming more accustomed to
answering these types of questions with regard to ESI, such as information from social
networking sites, and more liberal in admitting ESI into evidence.141
140

Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 538 (D. Md. 2007); see also THOMAS

BUCKLES, LAWS OF EVIDENCE 13 (2003). After enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence in
1975, the Uniform Rules of Evidence, originally providing a framework for the Federal Rules,
were amended to match the Federal Rules. Id. The majority of states currently have adopted the
Uniform Rules of Evidence or use them as a model. Id.; see also Uniform Rules of Evidence
Locator, CORNELL UNIV. LAW SCH. LEGAL INFO. INST. (Mar. 5, 2003),
http://www.law.cornell.edu/uniform/evidence.html.
141

See Robert C. Rodriguez, Decisions Reflect Importance, Limitations of Evidence Obtained

from Internet, LITIG. NEWS (Feb. 3, 2010),
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Workers‘ compensation judges generally have broad discretion142 and are not bound by
state or federal rules of evidence, and therefore social networking evidence may be admitted
even more liberally in workers‘ compensation courts than in state or federal court.143 Relaxed
http://www.abanet.org/litigation/litigationnews/top_stories/020310-evidence-admissibilitysocial-networking-saadi-dockery.html (―Courts are becoming more comfortable with Internet
evidence and perhaps more liberal in allowing such information into evidence.‖).
142

See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 176.411, subdiv. 1 (2008); Bey v. Oxford Props., Inc., 481 N.W.2d

40, 42 (Minn. 1992) (―In view of the well recognized principles that . . . the compensation judge
is not bound by rules of evidence or by technical or formal rules of pleading or procedure . . . .‖).
However, workers‘ compensation courts generally cannot adopt rules of evidence that are more
restrictive than the state court rules of evidence. See, e.g., Fite v. Ammco Tools, Inc., 258
N.W.2d 922, 926 (Neb. 1977) (―The compensation court is empowered to admit evidence not
admissible in the trial courts of this state. It does not, as we understand it, grant to the
compensation court the right to establish rules of evidence which are more restrictive than the
rules applicable to the trial courts of this state.‖).
143

See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 176.411, subdiv. 1 (―[T]he compensation judge is bound neither by

the common law or statutory rules of evidence nor by technical or formal rules of pleading or
procedure.‖); In re Wilson, 911 P.2d 754, 758 (Idaho 1996) (―[I]n those areas where the
Commission possesses particular expertise, it has the discretionary power to consider reliable,
trustworthy evidence having probative value in reaching its decisions . . . even if such evidence
would not be ordinarily admissible in a court of law.‖ (quoting Thom v. Callhan, 540 P.2d 1330,
1333 (Idaho 1975))); Roberts v. J.C. Penney Co., 949 P.2d 613, 621 (Kan. 1997) (―We are not
unaware of the decisions holding that ‗the rules of evidence . . . are not applicable in workers‘
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rules of evidence provide for informal and faster resolution of claims, consistent with workers‘
compensation‘s underlying goal of efficiency 144
For example, one major obstacle to the admissibility of social networking evidence in
state or federal court is the hearsay rule.145 Hearsay evidence that is inadmissible in state or
compensations proceedings. . . . The admissibility of evidence is more liberal in compensation
cases, not more restrictive.‘‖ (quoting Rodriguez v. Henkle Drilling & Supply Co., 828 P.2d
1335, 1341 (Kan. Ct. App. 1992)) (internal quotations omitted)); Adkins v. R & S Body Co., 58
S.W.3d 428, 430 (Ky. 2001) (―[T]he principles that control the admissibility of evidence in a
personal injury action . . . do not apply to workers‘ compensation proceedings.‖). A few states,
however, follow a contrary rule binding workers‘ compensation courts to the state rules of
evidence. See, e.g., Paganelis v. Indus. Comm‘n, 548 N.E.2d 1033, 1038 (Ill. 1989) (―Except
when the [Workers‘ Compensation] Act provides otherwise, the rules of evidence apply to
Industrial Commission proceedings, including those conducted before the arbitrator.‖).
144

See Kenneth M. Berman, The Current State of Workers‘ Compensation Law and Practice,

584 PLI/Lit 327, 330–31 (1998) (―The Acts are typically administered by a Workers
Compensation Commission . . . that employ relaxed rules of evidence designed to provide for
informal and rapid resolution of claims.‖).
145

See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 176.411, subdiv. 1 (―Hearsay evidence which is reliable is

admissible.‖). Hearsay is generally defined as an out-of-court statement offered in court to prove
the truth of the mattered asserted. See FED. R. EVID. 801. Even when judges are bound by
hearsay rules, social networking evidence is often admissible due to the hearsay exception for an
admission by a party opponent under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2). However, workers‘
compensation judges often admit hearsay evidence directly. See, e.g., Cargill, Inc. v. Conley, 620
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federal court is often admissible in workers‘ compensation courts.146 As the finder of fact,
workers‘ compensation judges have discretion to determine if hearsay evidence should be
excluded as ―worthless rumor or gossip‖ or admitted as persuasive and reliable evidence.147
Judges, however, may not entirely abandon the state court rules of evidence.148 Workers‘
compensation courts are the ―gatekeepers‖ of what evidence to admit at trial,149 and, in doing so,

N.W.2d 496, 502 (Iowa 2000) (admitting hearsay evidence when the information is within the
knowledge of the employer); Chaisson v. Cajun Bag & Supply Co., 708 So. 2d 375, 382 (La.
1998) (providing that the ―general rule‖ in workers‘ compensation courts ―is to allow hearsay
evidence‖); Lunde v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers‘ Compensation Div., 6 P.3d 1256, 1260 (Wyo.
2000) (stating that ―a broad range of informal evidence, including hearsay, is admissible in
workers‘ compensation‖ courts).
146

See, e.g., Keiser v. Dick Lind Heating Co., 1996 WL 705445, at *4–5 (Minn. W.C.C.A. Nov.

22, 1996) (admitting parts of investigative reports that the employee alleged were hearsay).
147

Reynolds Metals Co. v. Indus. Comm‘n, 402 P.2d 414, 417 (Ariz. 1965) (―Much hearsay is

worthless rumor or gossip, but there is also such a thing as ‗persuasive hearsay‘ and the factfinding commission may be given credit for the ability to distinguish the one from the other.‖).
148

See, e.g., Hudson v. Horseshoe Club Operating Co., 916 P.2d 786, 788–91 (Nev. 1996)

(applying a relevancy standard for admissibility of evidence in a workers‘ compensation matter);
City of Pittsburgh v. Workmen‘s Compensation Appeal Bd., 315 A.2d 901, 903 (Pa. Cmwlth.
1974) (―However, it has been held that section 422, and similar enactments applicable to
administrative and quasi-judicial bodies are not authority for denying parties in adversary
proceedings fundamental rights embraced by some rules of evidence.‖).
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they are bound by a standard of relevance.150 Though formulations vary, evidence is ―relevant‖
if it ―tends to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the
action more or less probable than it would be without the evidence.‖151
State and federal courts apply the same relevancy standard to ESI as to any other form of
evidence.152 For example, a Texas court admitted evidence from a mother‘s MySpace profile in a
family law matter. In terminating the mother‘s parental rights, the Texas Court of Appeals
admitted—and relied upon—two MySpace pictures that ―were captioned ‗At Ashley House
Dranking it Up [sic],‘ and ‗Me Helping Ashley Stand Up, Were Both Drunk [sic],‘‖ as well as
several photographs from a MySpace page showing the mother at a bar.153

149

Rodriguez, supra note 141 (―Lawyers should also keep in mind that courts are essentially the

―gatekeepers‖ of what evidence comes in at trial . . .‖).
150

See MINN. STAT. § 176.411, subdiv. 1 (2008) (providing that ―findings of fact shall be based

upon relevant and material evidence only‖); 1 PA. CODE § 35.161 (1989) (―relevant and material
evidence shall be admissible‖), available at
http://www.pacode.com/secure/data/001/chapter35/chap35toc.html.
151

FED. R. EVID. 401.

152

See, e.g., In re F.P., 878 A.2d 91, 96 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005) (―We see no justification for

constructing unique rules for admissibility of electronic communications such as instant
messages; they are to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis as any other document to determine
whether or not there has been an adequate foundational showing of their relevance and
authenticity.‖).
153

Mann v. Dep‘t of Family & Protective Servs., No. 01-08-01004-CV, 2009 WL 2961396,
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Similarly, workers‘ compensation courts should apply their liberal evidentiary rules to
admit social networking evidence that is relevant, just as they do with traditional forms of
surveillance evidence. ―[T]he admission of [surveillance] evidence is within the discretion of the
Workers‘ Compensation Court.‖154 In Keiser v. Dick Lind Heating Co., an employee injured his
low back at work.155 Surveillance by the defense found that the employee was exaggerating his
limp, and later surveillance, on video, showed the employee installing heating ducts.156 The
employee was receiving temporary total disability benefits at this time and defense counsel filed
a ―notice of intent to discontinue temporary total disability benefits‖ based on the fact that the
employee was working.157 Defense counsel offered reports at hearing prepared by an
investigation firm the insurer hired to perform surveillance of the employee‘s activities.158 The
employee objected on the basis of hearsay, arguing that the reports included statements made ―by
unidentified third parties‖ to investigators, and that the surveillance reports failed to identify
which of several investigators prepared which parts of the reports.159 The defense argued that it
had disclosed its intent to use the investigative reports months prior and had given plaintiff‘s

at *10 (Tex. App. Sept. 17, 2009).
154

Aken v. Neb. Methodist Hosp., 511 N.W.2d 762, 768 (Neb. 1994).

155

Keiser v. Dick Lind Heating Co., 1996 WL 705445, at *2 (Minn. W.C.C.A. Nov. 22, 1996).

156

Id.

157

Id. at *3.

158

Id. at *4.

159

Id.
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counsel copies of the reports at that time.160 In addition, all but one of the investigators attended
the hearing and the plaintiff was free to call them for cross-examination.161
The compensation judge excluded portions of the investigative reports containing
statements made by unidentified non-parties, but admitted the rest of the reports into evidence
because the testimony of the supervising investigator provided their foundation.162 On appeal, the
employee argued that the reports should be excluded because they were unreliable hearsay due to
the investigators‘ misrepresentations during their investigation, making the investigators
unreliable witnesses.163 The workers‘ compensation court of appeals found that the trial judge
did not abuse his discretion in admitting the evidence.164 Similarly, workers‘ compensation
judges have discretion to admit social networking evidence, in some cases even if acquired
deceptively,165 as gathering evidence from a social networking site is a form of surveillance.166
To the extent such information is relevant to an employee‘s injuries or employment abilities, and
has the proper foundation and authentication, the court should admit it into evidence.
2.

Foundation and Authentication

Whether evidence is offered in electronic or paper form, state and federal courts can
admit the proffered evidence only if, in addition to being relevant, it is properly authenticated.
160

Id.

161

Id.

162

Id.

163

Id.

164

Id. at *4–5.

165

See supra note 130 and accompanying text.

166

See supra note 18.
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Authentication ―is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question
is what its proponent claims.‖167 The proffering party has to establish that there is a reasonable
basis for the court to draw this finding.168 As in Keiser v. Dick Lind Heating Co., where the
workers‘ compensation judge permitted surveillance evidence based on the testimony of one of
the investigating officers, who was available to the plaintiff for cross-examination,169 foundation

167

FED. R. EVID. 901(a). The party offering the evidence must lay a foundation for the judge to

find the evidence authentic. See, e.g., Ruiz v. Virginia, No. 1915-07-4, 2008 Va. App. LEXIS
566, at *12, *16 (Dec. 23, 2008) (―Foundation is a more general term for what the proponent of
evidence must establish before the evidence can be admitted. . . . [T]he proponent of a document
having the characteristics of a business record establishes the proper evidentiary foundation for
the introduction of the document into evidence by establishing that the document is authentic.‖).
Although workers‘ compensation judges are not bound by the federal or state rules of evidence,
this standard for authentication provides a starting point.
168

See, e.g., Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 542, 544 (D. Md. 2007) (―A party

seeking to admit an exhibit need only make a prima facie showing that it is what he or she claims
it to be. . . . The degree of foundation required to authenticate computer-based evidence depends
on the quality and completeness of the data input, the complexity of the computer processing, the
routineness of the computer operation, and the ability to test and verify results of the computer
processing.‖).
169

Keiser, 1996 WL 705445, at *4.
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for authentication of social networking evidence can be established by the investigator, attorney,
or paralegal who found the information about the employee on the social networking site.170
Even with workers‘ compensation‘s relaxed evidentiary rules, defense counsel has to
establish that any information from an employee‘s social networking account was posted by the
employee, because individuals can open social networking accounts under the names of other
people.171 It is important for the person who downloaded the information from the employee‘s
social networking account to be available to testify as to when and how it was obtained and to
170

Unlike surveillance evidence that is obtained through informal discovery, social networking

evidence may be obtained through formal discovery as well. See supra Part II.A.3. When social
networking evidence is provided by the plaintiff in discovery, foundation and authentication are
not in issue, as the plaintiff does not dispute the authenticity of the evidence. In cases where
information from a plaintiff‘s social networking profile is obtained by informal discovery,
however, defense counsel has to authenticate the evidence she seeks to introduce.
171

Cf. Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 542–43 (indicating that courts examine foundational requirements

more carefully for electronically stored information than for hard-copy documents); St. Clair v.
Johnny‘s Oyster & Shrimp, Inc., 76 F. Supp. 2d 773, 775 (S.D. Tex. 1999) (―[T]he Court holds
no illusions that hackers can adulterate the content on any web-site from any location at any
time.‖); see also Keiser, 1996 WL 705445, at *4 (excluding surveillance evidence from
unidentified third parties). One major difference between video surveillance and information
gathered from social networking sites is that, with electronically stored evidence, there is an
issue as to the source of the information, an issue raised in St. Clair. The Keiser court indicates
that defense counsel‘s inability to identify a source of information is grounds for exclusion in
workers‘ compensation cases. Keiser, 1996 WL 705445, at *4–5.
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confirm that the copy is accurate.172 Defense counsel also has to offer proof that the owner of the
social networking account (the employee) actually wrote what counsel is introducing. The
normal methods of proving authorship of social networking material include the admission of the
author or testimony of a witness who observed the material‘s authorship.173 Another way to
authenticate such material is to demonstrate the writing matches the plaintiff‘s distinctive
style.174 If the plaintiff denies that the information on the social networking profile is hers despite
a reasonable showing by defense counsel, the workers‘ compensation court can admit the
evidence and evaluate the employee‘s credibility in deciding how much weight to assign to it.
3.

The Notice Requirement

Although there are no workers‘ compensation rules specific to notice or disclosure of
social networking evidence obtained through informal discovery, rules regulating the disclosure
172

See Levine & Swatski-Lebson, supra note 14, at 3.

173

See id.

174

See Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 544 (―Although Rule 901(a) addresses the requirement to

authenticate electronically generated or electronically stored evidence, it is silent regarding how
to do so. Rule 901(b), however, provides examples of how authentication may be accomplished.
It states: ‗(b) Illustrations. By way of illustration only, and not by way of limitation, the
following are examples of authentication or identification conforming with the requirements of
this rule: . . . (4) Distinctive characteristics and the like. Appearance, contents, substance,
internal patterns, or other distinctive characteristics, taken in conjunction with circumstances.‘‖).
Prior postings or other writings by the plaintiff indicating a particular writing pattern, style, or
other identifiable characteristics may therefore be used to authenticate social networking
evidence.
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of surveillance evidence should apply. In at least some states, in a workers‘ compensation case,
parties are required to make pretrial disclosure of surveillance evidence to opposing parties, to
prevent unfair surprise or prejudice, or else they risk preclusion from offering the evidence at the
hearing or trial.175 To the extent that states do not have specific rules governing notice or

175

See, e.g., MINN. R. 1420.2200, subp. 8(A) (2006) (―A party possessing relevant surveillance

evidence must disclose the existence of said evidence to opposing parties . . . no later than 30
days prior to the hearing date.‖); 34 PA. CODE § 131.61 (2002), added by 32 PA. BULL. 6043
(Dec. 7, 2002) (―Parties shall exchange all items and information, including medical documents,
reports, records, employment records, wage information, affidavits, tapes, films and
photographs, lists of witnesses, CD ROMs, diskettes and other digital recordings, to be used in or
obtained for the purpose of prosecuting or defending a case, unless the foregoing are otherwise
privileged or unavailable, whether or not intended to be used as evidence or exhibits.‖); 34 PA.
CODE § 131.68 (2002), added by 32 PA. BULL. 6043 (―The deposition may be used to locate,
authenticate and obtain copies of records which are material and relevant to the proceeding,
including: . . . (9) Surveillance.‖); Mielteski v. Banks, 854 A.2d 579, 580 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004)
(finding that the trial court did not err in ―excluding from the jury videotape surveillance
evidence of Appellee, Ireneusz ‗Eric‘ Mietelski, due to unfair surprise and prejudice caused by
late production of the tape.‖). Surveillance evidence in workers‘ compensation matters could
include ―any photographic, video, digital, motion picture, or other electronic recording or
depiction of a party surreptitiously taken or obtained without the party‘s expressed permission or
knowledge.‖ MINN. R. 1420.2200, subp. 8(A). That definition encompasses information,
communications, and photographs from a social networking site.
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disclosure of surveillance evidence, ordinary rules of notice and disclosure under the workers‘
compensation laws should apply.
In giving notice of social networking evidence, defense attorneys must provide copies to
opposing counsel of what they intend to introduce at hearing or trial.176 However, workers‘
compensation judges likely have the discretion to permit a party to withhold disclosure of social
networking and other surveillance evidence until after the time of an employee‘s deposition.177
B.

CREDIBILITY AND WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE

Although there is a liberal standard for the admissibility of evidence, including hearsay,
in workers‘ compensation courts, evidence must be probative, trustworthy, and credible.178 As
administrative agencies, these courts have the power to evaluate and weigh the credibility of
evidence.179 Courts may accept all or part of the testimony of any witness.180 In determining
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See, e.g., MINN. R. 1420.2200, subp. 8(A).

177

See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 71-3-61(1) (West Supp. 2007); Congleton v. Shellfish Culture,

Inc., 807 So. 2d 492, 496 (Miss. Ct. App. 2002) (―The power to control when evidence is
presented is well within the administrative law judge‘s statutory power.‖).
178

See Story v. Wyo. State Bd. of Med. Exam‘rs, 721 P.2d 1013, 1018 (Wyo. 1986) (―Where

hearsay evidence is by statute admissible in administrative proceedings, it is often held that it
must be probative, trustworthy and credible; and, although it may not be the sole basis for
establishing an essential fact and is insufficient to support an administrative decision, it may be
considered as corroborative of facts otherwise established.‖).
179

See Kloepfer v. Lumbermen‘s Mut. Cas. Co., 916 P.2d 1310, 1312 (Mont. 1996) (―The

Workers‘ Compensation Court, as the finder of fact, is in the best position to assess witnesses‘
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credibility, workers‘ compensation judges often pay close attention to evidence impeaching or
contradicting an employee‘s credibility,181 and this can include surveillance evidence.
In Aken v. Nebraska Methodist Hospital, the Supreme Court of Nebraska overturned the
workers‘ compensation court of appeals and upheld the compensation judge who relied on the
defense‘s video evidence to find that the plaintiff lacked credibility.182 The plaintiff in Aken
worked as a nurse.183 She argued that she was unable to perform her job duties as a result of a
work injury and called witnesses at hearing to testify to that effect.184 Evidence presented by both
the plaintiff and defendant at trial revealed conflicting diagnoses from doctors.185 At the time of
credibility and testimony.‖); Wagaman v. Sioux Falls Constr., 576 N.W.2d 237, 242 (S.D. 1998)
(―Department is allowed to weigh the evidence and determine the credibility of the witnesses.‖).
180

See Jordan v. Workmen‘s Compensation Appeal Bd. (Consol. Elec. Distribs.), 704 A.2d

1063, 1066 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1997) (―[T]he factfinder in a workers‘ compensation proceeding may
accept the testimony of any witness in whole or in part.‖).
181

See McGee v. J.D. Lumber, 17 P.3d 272, 278 (Idaho 2000) (―Evidence impeaching a

claimant‘s credibility need not be ignored . . . .‖); Schneider v. S.D. Dep‘t of Transp., 628
N.W.2d 725, 729–30 (S.D. 2001) (―The Department, after hearing numerous inconsistent
statements made by Schneider, found Schneider to be not credible. ‗Where there are two
permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder‘s choice between them cannot be clearly
erroneous.‘‖).
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511 N.W.2d 762, 768–69 (Neb. 1994).

183

Id. at 765.
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Id. at 766.

185

Id. at 765–66.
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rehearing, the defense offered a report by a private investigator that ―described surreptitious
visual and videotaped surveillance‖ and the court admitted a surveillance videotape of the
employee.186
The plaintiff testified that even on a ―good‖ day, she ―limped noticeably‖ and ―a layman
could see the limp.‖187 The surveillance tape, however, showed the plaintiff doing activities such
as walking, carrying a child, carrying boxes, and moving furniture with ease and without any
noticeable limping.188 The court admitted the surveillance evidence and relied on it heavily in
terminating the employee‘s workers‘ compensation benefits.189 The type of analysis and
reasoning in Aken in which the court admitted video surveillance evidence and subsequently
used it to weigh the plaintiff‘s credibility is likely applicable to social networking evidence
showing or discussing an employee‘s participation in physical activities.190 If a workers‘
compensation judge finds an abundance of evidentiary inconsistencies, preventing a
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Id. at 766.

187

Id.

188

Id.

189

Id. at 768–69.

190

There are no published workers‘ compensation cases directly discussing the credibility of

social networking evidence. The Texas Court of Appeals, however, considered the credibility of
evidence from MySpace.com. In re J.W., No. 10-09-00127-CV, 2009 WL 5155784, at *4 (Tex.
App. Dec. 30, 2009) (―[T]he trial judge said that he would ‗consider the credibility of the
source‘—MySpace.‖).
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determination that the plaintiff‘s injury is compensable, the employee has failed to meet her
burden of proof necessary to win the case.191
A final evidentiary issue present in workers‘ compensation cases is for the compensation
judge to balance the probative value of the evidence against the potential for unfair
prejudice.192 There is, again, an absence of workers‘ compensation cases addressing this
particular issue with regard to social networking evidence, but two federal court cases are
instructive. In U.S. v. Drummond, a federal criminal case, the court discussed the admissibility of
pictures from a MySpace account, weighing the probative value versus the danger of unfair
prejudice.193 The court found the relevant photographs to provide probative value as to whether
191

See Aken, 511 N.W.2d at 766 (―The evidence presents a question of credibility. The Court

received Exhibits 1-23 which included two videotapes showing plaintiff walking briskly and
carrying boxes. This evidence is wholly inconsistent with plaintiff's assertions that she must walk
on the sides of her feet to avoid pain and must avoid all carrying of groceries and that her pain
has completely incapacitated her.‖ (quoting the compensation court panel)); see also In re
Corman, 909 P.2d 966, 971–72 (Wyo. 1996) (―Inconsistencies in the evidence that prevent the
finder of fact from determining whether the injury is compensable mean that the claimant has
failed to meet his burden of proof. A claimant cannot prevail if factors necessary to prove his
claim are left to conjecture.‖).
192

This standard is based on Federal Rule of Evidence 403 but is also a universal standard used

by workers‘ compensation judges. See, e.g., Dixon Prop. Co. v. Shaw, 2 P.3d 330, 332 n.4 (Okla.
1999).
193

U.S. v. Drummond, No. 1:09-cr-00159, 2010 WL 1329059, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 29, 2010)

(quoting FED. R. EVID. 403).
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the defendant committed the crime at issue.194 The court went on to discuss the possibility of the
evidence being prejudicial to the defendant.195 Ultimately, the court found that, depending on the
testimony presented at trial, the probative value of the photographs may outweigh any danger of
unfair prejudice.196 The court deferred on making a ruling, finding that it must wait until the
time of trial to rule based on whether the testimony regarding the alleged crime and the
defendant‘s source of income is disputed at trial.197
An insurance law case addressing the admissibility of ESI provides a closer comparison
to workers‘ compensation for evaluating the danger of unfair prejudice and its potential
194

Id. The MySpace photographs from Drummond depicted the defendant holding wads of

money and a gun. Id. at *1 (―The photos depict Defendant counting, showing-off, and throwing
large wads of cash while wearing a hat and sunglasses. . . . Additionally, one photo depicts
Defendant either pretending to point a gun at the camera or pointing a gun at the camera.‖).
195

Id. at *2.

196

Id.

197

Id. (―[I]f testimony presents evidence that Defendant had no known source of income and yet

often had significant quantities of cash on-hand, but Defendant disputes having possessed large
amounts cash, it is possible that the relevance of the photos could outweigh any unfair prejudice.
. . . As the Government suggests, possession of a firearm may be relevant to a charge of drug
trafficking because firearms are known to be ‗tools of the trade‘ of drug trafficking. . . .
However, the Government has not stated that testimony in this case will support the assertion
that Defendant or the members of his conspiracy used firearms in furtherance of their drugtrafficking endeavors. Therefore, it is unclear to the Court that, in this case, possession of a
firearm is intrinsic to the drug trafficking or conspiracy charged.‖).
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consequences for both the plaintiff and defendant. In Lorraine v. Markel American Insurance
Co., a boat insured by Markel American Insurance was damaged by lightening.198 Magistrate
Judge Grimm raised and analyzed the issue of balancing the danger of unfair prejudice against
the probative value of e-mails, computer animations and simulations, and digital photographs
although neither the plaintiff nor defendant directly raised this issue.199 In evaluating this final
hurdle to admissibility, Magistrate Judge Grimm stated that it is generally better to admit
evidence if there is any doubt about the danger of unfair prejudice.200
Lorraine suggests that in addressing the admissibility of ESI, courts will play particular
attention to the danger of unfair prejudice outweighing the probative value of electronic evidence
when ―the evidence would contain offensive or highly derogatory language that may provoke an
emotional response.‖201 Relevant social networking evidence should be admissible in workers‘
compensation cases because it involves an employee‘s physical capabilities and is unlikely to
contain offensive or derogatory language or depictions. Also, judges in workers‘ compensations
198

241 F.R.D. 534, 534 (D. Md. 2007).

199

Id. at 583.

200

Id. (―Generally, ‗[i]f there is doubt about the existence of unfair prejudice, confusion of

issues, misleading, undue delay, or waste of time, it is generally better practice to admit the
evidence, taking necessary precautions of contemporaneous instructions to the jury followed by
additional admonitions in the charge.‘‖ (quoting JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER,
WEINSTEIN‘S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 403.02(2)(c) (Joseph M. McLaughlin 2d ed. 1997))).
Obviously, providing proper instructions to the jury is not applicable to workers‘ compensation
matters where decisions are made by judges and not juries.
201

Id.
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courts can control for emotional persuasion in a way that judges sending cases to juries cannot,
reducing the risk of prejudice. Yet, workers‘ compensation attorneys do need to consider
whether information from an employee‘s social networking profile would ―unfairly prejudice the
party against whom it is offered‖ or ―unduly delay the trial of the case.‖202
Courts or legislators should not adopt rigid rules adopting or banning evidence from
social networking sites in workers‘ compensation cases. Rather, workers‘ compensation judges
should hear the evidence and decide whether to give it weight and, if so, how much. Judges are
gatekeepers of social networking evidence, and they need to understand and evaluate this form of
technology in particular cases.
V.

CONCLUSION
The lawyers, judges, insurance companies, and parties within workers‘ compensation

systems will increasingly confront the discovery, privacy, professional responsibility, and
evidentiary issues that arise at the crossroads of workers‘ compensation law and social
networking. In the absence of case law and ethics opinions that discuss these exact issues, this
article starts with the rules that govern workers‘ compensation cases, and discusses how they
might apply to lawyers gathering, producing, and introducing evidence from social networking
sites. But this article is only a starting point. As workers‘ compensation systems are built on
202

Id. at 584 (―Thus, when a lawyer analyzes the admissibility of electronic evidence, he or she

should consider whether it would unfairly prejudice the party against whom it is offered, . . .
unduly delay the trial of the case, or interject collateral matters into the case.‖). The issue of
undue delay plays heightened importance in balancing probative value versus the danger of
unfair prejudice in workers‘ compensation cases because of workers‘ compensation‘s underlying
emphasis on efficiency.
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efficiency, flexibility, and discretion, workers‘ compensation is an ideal area of law for lawyers
and judges to experiment with how to address some of the unique challenges and opportunities
that social networking poses in litigation.
While there is a lack of legal authority on these issues, that should not cloud the reality
that many employees are using social networking in their daily lives. One thing of which we are
certain is that lawyers who practice in the workers‘ compensation field need to be able to
navigate around social networking sites such as Facebook, LinkedIn, and MySpace, and know
how they work. Social networking is no longer a new technology, and ignorance should not be
an excuse to the applicability of evidence from social networking sites in litigation.
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